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1 Juridification of Custom
Introduction
This chapter examines the theoretical construct of the idea of custom and 
its  application  in  the  formation  of  rules  of  customary  law  in  the 
international legal system. This enterprise has a dual purpose. The first is 
to  confirm  the  legitimacy  deficit  in  customary  international  law.  The 
second  is  to  inform attempts  to  reformulate  custom of  the  issues.  This 
chapter  will  show  first,  that  both  treaty  and  usage  origins  of  custom 
premise the emergence of a norm of customary international  law on the 
consummation  of  State  practice  (SP)  and  a  belief  that  that  particular 
practice was obligatory - also known as opinio juris sive necissitatis (OJ). 
More importantly, it will show that far from making certain the distinction 
between legal customs and mere usage this definition of custom does not 
fully account for the process by which norms of customary international 
law are created. This situation is unacceptable for a process credited with 
creating the  majority  of  rules  that  regulate  the  behaviour  of  nearly  two 
hundred States one with another. 
Etymology of Custom
The word custom is part of everyday vocabulary in all languages, meaning 
the habitual behaviour of people in a particular community.1 Once adopted 
by lawyers this word, like many others assumes ambiguities that must be 
attended.2 Because customs exist everywhere,3 it is necessary to distinguish 
between legal customs and non-legal customs. This distinction is useful not 
least because it fastens onto legitimacy endearing tenets of transparency, 
coherency, consistency, determinacy and predictability. 
Therefore,  it  is  proposed first,  to  establish the etymological  and 
perceptual origins of the idea of customary international law, and second, 
to  examine  international  jurisprudence  and  discourse  on  the  idea.  Of 
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particular interest to this study in the archive of discourse on this matter is 
the current work of the International Law Association Committee on the 
Formation of Customary International  Law whose mandate is  to try and 
explain away custom’s paradox.4 The impact on custom of developments in 
specific areas of international law such as human rights, law of the sea and 
environmental law will also be analysed. Finally, the source of obligation 
of  rules  of  customary  international  law  will  be  considered  in  order  to 
inform  any  effort  to  address  the  legitimacy  deficit  in  custom.  The 
hypothesis  is  that  a  high correlation  between the  International  Court  of 
Justice’s  (ICJ)  jurisprudence  on  custom,  the  writings  of  publicists  and 
other  international  institutions  points  to  a  high  degree  of  custom’s 
transparency, consistency, coherency, determinacy and predictability while 
a low correlation points to a legitimacy deficit  in the doctrine. The null-
hypothesis  is  that  any correlation  of  views on custom is  due to  chance 
alone. 
Custom as a Law-creating Mechanism
Earliest evidence of recognition of custom as a tool for the creation of law 
in the international legal system appears in the works of Suarez,5 though it 
is  probably  of  greater  antiquity.  In  his  De legibus  ac  cleo  legislatore, 
which  first  appeared  in  1612,  Suarez  proposed  two  requirements  for 
ascertaining the existence of a rule of customary international law, namely, 
consensus and compliance with reason.6 The first requirement referred only 
to the sovereign’s and not the nation’s consent to particular practice. The 
second requirement referred to God’s will as revealed to man - the ratio.7 
Suarez premised custom on both positivist and naturalist philosophy.8 This 
view  of  custom  is  shared  by  Grotius  who  described  custom  as  an 
embodiment  of  a  practice  that  a  community tacitly  accepted  as  binding 
upon  it.9 The  distinguished  German  legal  scholars  Von  Savigny  and 
Puchta,10 who are widely regarded as the major protagonists  of  Grotius’ 
ideas,  anchored  the  doctrine  of  custom  on  what  modern  writers  now 
routinely call  the two limbs of custom, namely, State  practice  (SP) and 
opinio juris sive necessitatis (OJ). 
In his treatise on the contribution to development of international law 
of  the Hague Conferences,  Hull11 identifies  what  appears  to  be the  first 
formal treaty recognition of custom as a source of international law. The 
Conference of Brussels on the Laws and Customs of War (1874) provides 
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in article 9 that the laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, 
but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions:
1) That they be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
2) That they have a fixed distinctive emblem recognisable at a distance;
3) That they carry arms openly; and
4) That  they conduct  their  operations  in accordance with the  laws and 
customs of war.
In countries where militia constitute the army, or form part of it, they are 
included under the denomination “army”.
It adds in article 10 that:
The population of a territory which has not been occupied, who, on the 
approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading 
troops without having had time to organise themselves in accordance with 
article 9,  shall  be regarded as belligerents if  they respect  the laws and 
customs of war. 
It  is  curious  that  this  treaty,  which  was  never  ratified,  appeared  to 
distinguish  between  laws  of  war  and  customs of  war,  and  appeared  to 
privilege adherence first to laws, and second to customs if no laws existed. 
Such  a  distinction  compels  discovery  of  the  reason  why  States  would 
willingly submit their conduct to regulation of customs that are themselves 
not law. Did “laws of war” refer to treaty-based rules of international law 
only, and customs to uncodified rules of international law? This distinctive 
reference to laws of war and customs of war is common in humanitarian 
law  treaties  concluded  at  this  time.  As  an  example,  the  preamble  to 
Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
and its annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land (1889) reads: 
… Thinking it important, with this object, to revise the laws and general 
customs of war, either with the view of defining them more precisely or of 
laying down certain limits for the purpose of modifying their severity as 
far as possible.12
Nonetheless,  differentiating  between  treaty  and  custom  as  sources  of 
international law in this manner has fanned the general debate on whether 
or  not  article  38(1)  of  the  Statute  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice 
classified  the  sources  of  international  law  in  successive  order.  The 
Committee of Jurists  that  drafted this  Statute for the  League of Nations 
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regarded  article  38(1)(a)  - (d)  as  constituting a  hierarchical  ordering of 
sources and that  they were to be applied successively.13 Hudson14 writes 
that the deletion from this article of the Committee’s recommendation that 
these sources should be applied successively does not appear to have had 
any effect on the meaning of the direction.  If the parties to a convention 
have laid down an applicable rule, it will be controlling and tribunals may 
not need to look further. If that is not the case, a sufficient guide may be 
found  in  the  customary  law.  If  resort  to  general  principles  of  law  is 
necessary, however, the court will naturally want to know at the same time 
how  courts  have  applied  these  principles,  and  how  they  have  been 
evaluated in juristic writings. But article 38(1) does not establish such a 
rigid hierarchy. In applying a provision in a convention, a court may have 
to take into account the customary law prevalent when the convention was 
entered into, or general principles of law, as well as judicial precedents. 
To come back to the etymology of legal custom, twenty-five years 
after it had first been mentioned as a source of binding obligations between 
States an international convention ruled that situations not regulated by the 
treaty itself  would fall  under the jurisdiction of principles of the law of 
nations resulting from: “ … usage existing among civilised nations, from 
the laws of humanity and the postulates of public conscience”.15 This seems 
to have followed directly from de Marten’s appeal for the adoption of rules 
defining  belligerents,  made  in  response  to  Beernaert  of  Belgium  who 
advocated for non-recognition of belligerents. Beernaert argued that while 
the humane function of such rules  was quite obvious,  such rules  would 
target  matters  that  should  not  be  made  the  subject  of  international 
agreement.  These  matters,  he  suggested,  should  be  left:  “…  under  the 
dominion of that tacit and common law which arises from the principles of 
the law of nations”.16 de Marten’ argued, and it was accepted, that nations 
and belligerents should remain under the protection and sovereignty of the 
principles of law which flowed from established custom between civilised 
nations,  the  laws  of  humanity,  and  from  the  demands  of  the  public 
conscience.17 Article  1 of  the  Convention  includes  in  its  criteria  of 
determining circumstances that international law recognises as giving rise 
to the status of belligerents: “… the conduct of warfare in accordance with 
its  laws  and  customs”.  Customs remained  distinguished  from laws  that 
States readily could identify.
It was the  Advisory Committee of  Jurists,  commissioned by the 
Council of the League of Nations, that first suggested the entrenchment of 
custom as a process for the creation of rules of international  law in the 
treaty  that  formally  established  the  Permanent  Court  of  International 
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Justice (PCIJ). It proposed as sources of law to be applied by the new court 
the following: 
1) Conventional international law, whether general or special, being rules 
expressly adopted by states;
2) International custom, being practice between nations accepted by them 
as law;
3) The rules of international law as recognised by the legal conscience of 
civilised nations; and
4) International  jurisprudence  as  a  means  for  the  application  and 
development of law.18
It has to be remembered that the longest debate of the committee was on 
the type of jurisdiction that the court19 should have. Once it was settled that 
the court would have a compulsory jurisdiction,20 the Committee, anxious 
to quiet apprehensions that judges might make an undue use of their power 
by  interpreting  their  jurisdiction  as  if  they  had  legislative  authority,21 
inserted  article  35.  Article  35  appears  unchanged  as  article  38  of  the 
Statute of the ICJ, the successor court to the PCIJ. 
The Committee made no secret of the fact that the previous 1899 
and 1907 Hague Conferences had influenced its decision to include custom 
on its list of sources of international law,22 describing it as: 
… a very natural and extremely reliable method of development since it 
results entirely from the constant expression of the legal convictions and 
of the needs of the nations in their mutual inter-course. Not to recognise  
international custom as a principle, which the judge must follow in the 
absence of expressed conventional law, would be to misconstrue the true  
character and whole history of the law of nations.23 
This brief historical outline of the evolution of custom as a law-creating 
mechanism in international law plainly exposes the difficulty of juridifying 
the idea, i.e. giving it its distinguishing legal persona. Such a distinction is 
imperative  not  least  because  any  legal  system that  is  worth  that  name 
makes its subjects accountable for their conduct only by rules existent at 
the  time of  the  material  conduct.  Descamps emphasised  that  customary 
international  law should be precipitated by a constant  expression of the 
legal conviction and the needs of nations.24 It is not clear how this legal 
conviction  was to  be  identified  by all  nations  concerned,  and also  who 
among them would  determine  what  those  needs  of  the  community  that 
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merited regulation through customary international law were. What is clear 
though is that this committee regarded State consent  and practice as the 
lynchpins of customary international law. Descamps thought that the only 
thing  that  mattered  was  “…  whether  after  having  recorded  as  law 
conventions and custom, objective justice should be added ... It would be a 
great mistake to imagine that nations can be bound only by engagements 
which they have entered into by mutual consent”.25 
The final draft of the sources of the laws to be applied by the new 
court did not differ from the Descamps Committee Report. Even though 
the  League  of  Nations  Council  had  recommended  some  changes  to 
paragraph 2 of the English translation, no such changes were made.26 Nor 
did State parties make any changes to the Statute of the PCIJ27 when they 
had occasion to revise it in 1929.28 
The question whether the PCIJ would be re-established after the 
war, or whether a new court would be created, had exercised the minds of 
the  leading  allies  as  early  as  1942.  The  proposals  discussed  at  the 
Dumbarton Oaks Conference in October 1944 provided for  a court  as a 
“principal  judicial  organ”  of  the  new  world  organization  -  the  United 
Nations.  After  it  had been decided at the  Yalta  Conference in  February 
1945  to  convene  the  United  Nations  Conference  on  International 
Organization at San Francisco, a legal committee composed of forty-four 
States was instructed to elaborate a Draft Statute. Simma writes that: “… 
The draft  proposed by the committee followed to a large extent,  mostly 
textually,  the  Statute  of  the  PCIJ”.29 The  rapporteur for  that  committee 
reports that while article 38 of the Statute of the court was not itself well 
drafted, it was not possible to come up with a better draft in the short time 
that  his  Committee  had  been  given.30 In  consequence  the  doctrine  of 
custom that  has  developed until  now is  informed as much by the  more 
remote 1920 perspectives as by the more immediate 1945 zeitgeist which 
prompted the emergence of the United Nations. A charitable view is that, 
the  ICJ  has  consistently  teleologically  interpreted  article  38(1)(b) 
consistently  to  maintain  its  relevance  to  more  modern  perspectives  of 
international  law.  The  implications  of  this  argument  are  discussed 
generally in Chapter Three and extensively in Part II.
In the Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in 
the  Gulf  of  Maine,31 the  ICJ  stressed  that  in  any  deliberations  on  any 
question  presented  before  it,  the  court:  “… must  obviously  begin  with 
referring to article 38 of the Statute of the court”.32 Article 38 directs that 
the ICJ must apply the following:
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1) international treaties;
2) international custom;
3) general principles of law; and
4) judicial decisions and the teachings of publicists.
 Although this provision should not be regarded as a necessarily exhaustive 
statement of the sources of international law for all time33 any conceptual 
analysis  of  custom must  commence  with  an  analysis  of  the  content  of 
article 38(1)(b). Wolfke regards article 38(1)(b) as the embryo of all law 
governing international relations.34 The content of this provision has been 
the subject of intense debate and comment.35 The general view is that while 
it is custom that is the source to be applied, it is practice that evidences 
custom. Higgins writes that article 38(1)(b) should read: “… international 
custom as evidenced by a general practice accepted as law”.36 Regardless of 
this general understanding, customary international law does not appear to 
have shaken off  what  Higgins  calls:  “… the  continuing  controversy  on 
practice, custom, and opinio juris”.37 This study addresses the controversies 
that  appear  to  impair  custom’s  transparency,  consistency,  coherency, 
determinacy and predictability. 
Unpacking Custom’s Content
In assessing the content of customary international law, or what is regarded 
as evidence of customary international law, the use of evidence of custom 
is deliberately preferred to “source of custom”, which also appears in the 
literature.38 The  common  view39 is  that  the  latter  phrase  is  both 
metaphorical  and ambiguous,  and therefore  a  source  of  confusion.  This 
confusion is exacerbated in that jurists use this phrase when referring to 
different things in the discourse on custom. Corbett writes that: 
Source is  used by different  writers,  sometimes even the same writer  at 
different  times,  to  express  the  concepts  of  cause,  origin,  basis  and 
evidence. ... Taking two publicists so widely apart as Pradier-Fodere, the 
first  volume  of  whose  monumental  treatise  appeared  in  1885,  and  de 
Lonter in his Carnegie edition of 1920, we find that there has been little 
advance towards fixity or clearness. 40 
Still some jurists talk of  source when what they mean is: “… the formal 
source  -  the  customary  sine  qua  non of  every  rule  in  the  system, 
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(demanding) a distinct title which will remove all possibility of confusion 
with less vital matters. (And others understand it to mean) ... the material 
source,  -  the  historical  origins  of  a  rule”.41 The  International  Law 
Association  Committee  on  Formation  of  Customary  International  law 
writes that:
If  we were  to  mark a few molecules  of  water  percolating through the 
ground with a dye or a radioactive isotope, we could, ... identify the spot - 
and thus, we may presume, a moment - at which those molecules emerge 
from the ground to form part of the stream. With some stretching, this 
notion could be extended to municipal legislation or to treaties, which in a 
sense become law at a particular point in time. However, that is not really 
the case with custom: we cannot identify a particular moment at which it 
emerges as binding law. A tribunal or other decision maker may be able to 
say that it has already ripened or crystallised; but it would not only be 
necessary, but also inherently impossible, to identify a precise moment at 
which  that  had  occurred.  Furthermore,  the  customary  process  is  a 
continuing one, in the sense that established customary rules are constantly 
being either  reinforced or  undermined. Here,  in particular  the “moving 
picture” is to be preferred to the “photograph”.42
Difficulty with the use of the phrase source of custom in any discussion on 
the subject is clear. Corbett recommends that if this phrase is to be used at 
all,  its  application  should  be  limited  to:  “… the  origin  of  the  material 
content  of  a rule,  sometimes styled historical  source”.  43 As a matter  of 
caution this phrase will rarely be used in this study. Instead, reference will 
be made in this connection to  elements that generate rules of customary  
international law. Norm-generating processes are governed by what Hart44 
calls secondary rules of recognition. These declare how rules that regulate 
conduct of subjects of the legal system are created. Custom’s secondary 
rules of regulation declare how rules of customary international  law are 
created. The Vienna convention on the law of treaties declares how treaty 
rules  are  created.45 Rules  of  customary  international  law  must  show 
compliance  with  the  requirements  of  custom,  that  is,  that  States  have 
demonstrated  practice  in  the  sphere  of  regulation  of  the  norm, 
accompanied by a sense of obligation. Kelsen46 writes that secondary rules 
of recognition not only confer validity to primary norms created by their 
authority,  but  also  themselves  depend for  their  own validity  on a  more 
superior  rule  of  recognition,  ultimately  connected  to  the  basic  norm. 
Secondary rules of recognition also give primary rules their identity within 
the legal system in that they point to their formal and material elements.47 
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The International Law Association Committee on Customary International 
law has described secondary rules of recognition as: “… Those processes, 
compliance with which endows a rule with legal force; they are identified 
by the criteria of validity of the system”.48  The committee has described 
primary rules of recognition as the content that has contributed to the rule 
though it alone cannot bestow formal validity on the rule. “They are, so to 
speak,  the  quarry from which the  content  of  the  rule  has  been hewn”.49 
Therefore,  it  is  possible  to  speak  of  formal  and  material  elements  of 
custom. State practice and  opinio juris constitute the formal elements of 
custom.  Kopelmanus50 writes  that:  “…  There  are  two  factors  in  the 
formation of custom: (1) a material fact - the repetition of similar acts by 
states, and (2) a psychological element usually called the ‘opinio juris sive  
necessitatis’ ”. Hudson writes that:
… it is not possible for the court to apply a custom; instead, it can observe 
the general practice of States, and if it finds that such practice is due to a 
conception that the law requires it, it may declare that a rule of law exists 
and proceed to apply it. The elements necessary are  the concordant and  
recurring  action  of  numerous  States in  the  domain  of  international 
relations,  the conception in each case that such action was enjoined by  
law,  and the failure of other States to challenge that conception at that 
time.51 
But how in practice does the practitioner,  diplomat or judge distinguish 
between State practice that connotes the emergence of a nascent primary 
rule of customary international law, and practice that does not? This is the 
question that must be answered unambiguously in the ICJ’s jurisprudence 
and publicists’  discourse  if  custom is  to  become transparent,  consistent, 
coherent, determinate and predictable. 
One view is  that  only physical  acts  by a  State  in,  for  example, 
imposing  an  embargo  or  expelling  nationals  from  a  State  considered 
hostile,  constitute  practice  - the restrictive view. D’Amato argues that  a 
statement by a State can only be considered as evidence of opinio juris, but 
not as evidence of the material component of custom.52 Fitzmaurice53 is of 
the view that in the main: “… it is only the actions of States that build up 
practice, just as it is only practice that constitutes a usage or custom, and 
builds up eventually a rule of customary international law”. Akehurst does 
not distinguish between States’ physical acts, and their pronouncements. In 
his view either of them can be adduced as evidence of State practice54 - the 
open-ended approach. While the restrictive view has the potential to make 
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the law rigid,  inflexible  and sterile,  the  open-ended approach  offers  the 
potential to infuse imprecision into the practice of international tribunals, 
an effect that would detract and not enhance the transparency, determinacy, 
consistency, coherence and predictability of custom. Case law indicates55 
that  when  asked  to  determine  whether  a  new  norm  of  customary 
international law has emerged or not, international tribunals tend to apply 
the restrictive approach, and often resort to the open-ended in what appear 
to  be  situations  of  non-liquet.  In  his  dissenting  opinion  in  the  Anglo 
Norwegian Fisheries Case, Judge Reid, had this to say regarding evidence 
of State practice:
This cannot be established by citing cases where coastal states have made 
extensive  claims,  but  have  not  maintained  their  claims  by  the  actual 
assertion of  sovereignty over  trespassing ships.  ...  The only convincing  
evidence of State practice is to be found in seizures, where the coastal  
state  asserts its  sovereignty  over  the  water  in  question  by  arresting  a  
foreign ship and by maintaining its position in the course of diplomatic  
negotiation and international arbitration.56 
In  the  Nicaragua  Case,57 the  ICJ  curiously  invoked  General  Assembly 
resolution  262558 to  ascertain  State  practice  with  regard  to  the  use  of 
force.59 The  court  then  defined  this  process  as  restrictive  custom,  and 
examined State practice only to see whether a permissive modification of 
the  rule  allowing  intervention  in  support  of  rebel  forces  had  been 
established.60  According to the court:
This opinio juris may, though with all due caution, be deduced from, inter 
alia, the attitude of the Parties and the attitude of States towards certain 
General  Assembly resolutions,  and  particularly resolution  2625  (XXV) 
entitled  “Declaration  on  Principles  of  International  Law  concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations”. The effect of consent to the text of such 
resolutions  cannot  be  understood  as  merely  that  of  a  “reiteration  or 
elucidation” of the treaty commitment undertaken in the Charter. On the 
contrary, it may be understood as an acceptance of the validity of the rule 
or set of rules declared by the resolution by themselves …  The principle 
of non-use of force, for example, may thus be regarded as a principle of 
customary law, not as such conditioned by provisions relating to collective 
security, or  to  the facilities or  armed contingents to  be provided under 
article 43 of the Charter. It would therefore seem apparent that the attitude 
referred  to  expresses  an  opinio  juris respecting  such  a  rule  ...,  to  be 
thenceforth treated separately from the provisions, especially those of an 
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institutional  kind,  to  which  it  is  subject  on  treaty-law  plane  of  the 
Charter.61 
Mendelson62 argues  that  the  court’s  suggestion  that  a  United  Nations 
General  Assembly resolution  can be adduced  as  evidence  of  both  State 
practice and opinio juris for the purposes of determining the emergence of 
a rule of customary international law is highly controversial. This “double-
dealing” of the ICJ seems to negate the accepted view that a primary rule 
of customary international law emerges only when it can be demonstrated 
that the practice of States in question is accompanied by a mental attitude 
of  obligation.  Even  more,  it  appears  to  elevate  General  Assembly 
resolutions  to  a  status  previously  not  contemplated  when  the  United 
Nations  created  that  institution,  nor  is  evidence  available  that  the  
United  Nations  has  now  deliberately  bestowed  such  a  purpose  to  that 
institution. Further, instead of making clear the function of voting practices 
of State representatives in international organizations, it appears to throw 
the  value  of  those  voting  tendencies  into  further  controversy.63 It  is 
common knowledge that the United Nations Charter conspicuously denied 
legislative authority to the General Assembly. Its resolutions were initially 
intended only as recommendations, with no binding authority.64 However, 
the Committee on the Progressive Development of international law set by 
the General Assembly to research methods of implementing the objectives 
of article 13(1)(a) of the United Nations Charter states that declarations of 
the General  Assembly which restate  existing law should be admitted as 
evidence  of  State  practice.65 Notwithstanding  that  development,  the 
position  of  General  Assembly  resolutions  with  regard  to  customary 
international law remains controversial. A comparison of the direction of 
certain United Nations Charter provisions66 with the views of international 
bodies,67 and those  of  international  tribunals68 appears  to  complicate  the 
controversy on the value of General Assembly resolutions to the process of 
customary international law. In the Case Concerning East Timor,69 Portugal 
argued that  its  claim to exclusive  territorial  jurisdiction  over  the  Timor 
Gap was legally “given” by successive General Assembly resolutions that 
continued to recognise that territory as a non self-governing territory under 
Portugal’s trust.70 Even if it was not in effective control of that territory, 
Portugal  advanced  the  view  that  General  Assembly  resolutions  on  the 
matter were conclusive. 
The view that the definition of State practice should include the 
voting practices  of  States’  representatives  in  the  General  Assembly and 
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other  agencies  has  attracted  some  support.  Among  its  proponents  is 
Asamoah who writes that: 
Our contention is that “practice” should be understood in a wider sense to include 
verbal  forms.  Furthermore,  consensus  should  be  used  as  the  basis  for  the 
development  of  general  international  law.  One  must  concede  that  law can  be 
developed not only from a series of responses to events but also from consensus 
embodied in a resolution or some other similar document.71
In 1963 Higgins wrote: 
The United Nations is a very appropriate body to look for indications of 
developments  in  international  law,  for  international  custom  is  to  be 
deduced  from the  practice  of  States,  as  manifested  in  their  diplomatic 
actions and public pronouncements. With the development of international 
organizations,  the  votes  and  views of  States  have  come to  have  legal 
significance  as  evidence  of  customary laws.  Moreover,  the  practice  of 
States comprises their collective acts as well as the total of their individual 
acts  ...  collective  acts  of  States,  repeated  by  and  acquiesced  in  by 
sufficient numbers with sufficient frequency, eventually attain the status of 
law. The existence of the United Nations - and especially in its accelerated 
trend towards universality of membership since 1955 - now provides a 
very clear, very concentrated, focal point of State practice.72 
Mehr73 writes that some resolutions are passed to reaffirm the sanctity of 
established  rules  of  customary  international  law.  Therefore,  such 
resolutions  should  have  legal  significance  in  the  process  of  custom. 
Opposition of Western States to the widening of interpretation of “State 
practice” stems from the fact that developing countries boast a numerical 
strength in the General  Assembly. Churchill  and Lowe74 observe that by 
virtue  of  their  numerical  strength  in  the  General  Assembly,  developing 
States were able to secure in 1969 the passing of Resolution 2574, which 
declared a moratorium on seabed mining.
 
Some, especially the Islamic States, have asserted that this resolution is 
binding upon all  States in international  law. Western States vigorously 
deny this, and voted against the resolution, which was passed by sixty-two 
votes to twenty-eight, with twenty-eight abstentions. ... The Group of 77 
developing States ... has consistently regarded this resolution as a binding 
statement  of  law  rendering  unilateral  deep  seabed  mining  unlawful. 
Western States in accordance with their sound, and equally consistent,  
opinion that voting for United Nations resolutions does not of itself create  
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legal obligations, regard the resolution as merely a statement of political  
principle and intent.75 
The  main  argument  against  accepting  States’  voting  decisions  in  the 
General Assembly as evidence of State practice is that what States say does 
not  always correspond with what  they do.  But  whatever  its  merits,  this 
argument cannot be reconciled with the accepted view in international law 
that  unilateral  declarations  by  concerned  States  even  in  the  absence  of 
previous  State  practice  and  opinio  juris can  result  in  the  creation  of 
“instant custom”.76 It is also argued that individual statements made by a 
State are more likely with time to clash, than is their actual practice over 
time.77 Schwebel insists that those who deny that the General Assembly’s 
resolutions  affect  the  content  of  customary law also  observe that  States 
members often vote for much with which they do not agree. 
They may go along with a “consensus” to which they consent only in form 
and not in substance.  Their  delegates may vote uninstructed or  loosely 
instructed; they may vote in accordance with group dictates rather than as 
an expression of what their government believes that the law requires. The 
members of the General Assembly generally vote in response to political, 
not legal, considerations. The intention is not to affect the law but to make 
the  point  which  the  resolution  makes.  ...  The  United  Nations  General 
Assembly is a forum in which States can express their views, but what 
they  do  is  more  important  than  what  they  say,  and  especially  more 
important than what they say in the in the General Assembly.78
Such arguments have done little or nothing at all to persuade those on the 
other end of the continuum. Gunning insists that if only physical acts of 
States  were recognised,  then nations’  disputes  would always have to be 
addressed  through  physical,  largely  military  action  rather  than  through 
more peaceful  negotiations,  a  very unattractive  course  for  world  public 
order. She writes that:
If only physical acts are recognised, less powerful or less technologically 
and  economically  advanced  nations  will  have  little  voice  in  the 
development of custom. If for example, the only way to participate in the 
development  of  a  new custom on  coastal  fishing rights  is  to  have  the 
technological  and  monetary  capability  to  seize  or  destroy  trespassing 
ships, only those nations with sufficient resources will have a voice. Such 
a view undermines and perpetuates the inequality between industrialised 
nations and less developed countries.79
14  Legitimacy Deficit in Custom
It is presumed in article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice that States are the only actors whose conduct counts in the creation 
of  rules  of  customary  international  law.  Therefore  it  is  necessary  to 
ascertain how States manifest the belief that their behaviour is motivated 
only by a sense of legal obligation. This can be achieved by identifying in 
the  recognised  sequence  of  custom  a  conspicuous  mechanism  for 
determining  the  presence  or  lack  of  opinio  juris to  complement  State 
practice. It is held that those organs of the State whose business it  is to 
represent  the  State  are  an  authoritative  source  for  establishing  the 
motivations underlying State conduct in the international arena.80 Brownlie 
writes that:
The  material  sources  of  custom  are  very  numerous  and  include  the 
following diplomatic  correspondence,  policy statements,  press  releases, 
the opinions of legal  advisers,  official  manuals on legal  questions,  e.g. 
manuals of military law, executive decisions and practices, orders to naval 
forces  etc.,  comments  by  governments  on  drafts  presented  by  the 
International Law Commission, state legislation, international and national 
judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international instruments, a 
pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of international organs, 
and resolutions relating to legal questions in the United Nations General 
Assembly.81
  
Very often,  diplomatic conflicts  present  a fertile  exchange of arguments 
between States. The position taken by a State in such circumstances, and 
the arguments it uses to support its position in public, or before a tribunal, 
can be used as evidence of its belief of what is legally expected of it.82 It 
becomes  necessary  to  ask  which  of  these  evidences  of  customary 
international  law reflect  State practice and which  opinio juris – the two 
limbs of custom. If accepted, the view that when State practice on a matter 
becomes very general, that generality can be adduced as evidence of opinio  
juris confuses  the  distinction  initially  made  between  the  two  limbs  of 
custom, inclining the theory of custom towards obscurity and not clarity. It 
is  born  out  of  a  convenience  that  compromises  the  transparency, 
coherency,  consistency,  determinacy  and  predictability  of  custom.  It 
supports  the  negative  view  that  international  tribunals  insist  on 
unequivocal  evidence of  opinio  juris in  a negative fashion,  to  deny the 
emergence  of  a  new  rule  of  customary  international  law  if  it  appears 
expedient to do so in the circumstances, and less so when it suits them.83 
Wolfke  calls  this:  “…  the  problem  of  hierarchy  and  compensation  of 
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evidence in custom”.84 The practice of international  tribunals shows that 
quite  often,  they  determine  the  question  of opinio  juris  without  the 
remotest reference to the mental opinions of disputants. In the Lotus Case,85 
the  PCIJ  showed  that  it  was  concerned  more  with  examining  the  legal 
effect of the facts,  than with some elusive mental state of the parties.  It 
examined the principles  of  objective  and territorial  jurisdiction,  and the 
limitations placed on States by international law on this matter. It then used 
the facts before it  to declare that previous failure by States to prosecute 
foreign nationals committing felonies aboard vessels flying their flags in 
high seas had not established the customary duty not to prosecute criminals 
in similar circumstances in the future. It is important to note that in this 
case France had requested the court to nullify Turkey’s trial and sentencing 
of  French  nationals  in  charge  of  a  ship  that  had  been  involved  in  an 
accident with a Turkish ship, killing eight Turkish nationals on the high 
seas. France argued among other things that, Turkey lacked the criminal 
jurisdiction requisite to hold such a trial; and that for Turkey to exercise 
such jurisdiction, she must refer to some title to jurisdiction recognised by 
international law. Assuming that the court had followed France’s line of 
argument,  and  gone  on  to  inaugurate  a  customary  rule  allowing  for 
countries in Turkey’s position to prosecute foreign nationals, could France 
perhaps have argued that it did not recognise that customary rule because it 
did not consent to it? - a typical opinio juris argument. The court reasoned 
that: 
The first  and foremost restriction imposed by international  law upon a 
State is that - failing a permissive rule to the contrary - it may not exercise 
its  power  in  any form in  the  territory  of  another  State.  In  this  sense, 
jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside 
its  territory  except  by  virtue  of  a  permissive  rule  derived  from 
international custom or from convention. It does not, however, follow that 
international law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its own 
territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken 
place  abroad,  and  in  which it  cannot  rely on some permissive rule  of 
international law. Such a view would only be tenable if international law 
contained a general prohibition to States to extend the application of their 
laws and  the  jurisdiction  of  their  courts  to  persons,  property  and  acts 
outside their territory, and if, as an exception to this general prohibition, it 
allowed States to do so in certain specific cases. However, this is certainly 
not the case under international law as it stands at present. 86
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In the  Right  of  Passage  Case,87 the  ICJ  appeared  to  place  emphasis  on 
evidence of mutual rights and obligations between disputants, stating that:
This practice having continued over a period extending beyond a century 
and  a  quarter  unaffected  by  the  change  in  regime  in  respect  of  the 
intervening territory which occurred when India became independent, the 
court is, in view of all the circumstances of the case, satisfied that that 
practice was accepted as law by the Parties and has given rise to a right  
and a correlative obligation.88
   
The exercise by a State of a right which affected States perceive as giving 
rise to a corollary duty is acceptable as sufficient evidence of opinio juris. 
Thus,  in  the  Asylum  Case89 where  Columbia  claimed  that  Peru  had 
breached a rule of regional customary international law on the granting of 
asylum  to  fugitives,  the  court  held  that  in  order  to  sustain  its  claim, 
Columbia  had to  prove that  this  custom had been established in such a 
manner that it had become binding on Peru also. According to the court:
The Colombian Government must prove that the rule invoked by it is in 
accordance with a constant and uniform ussage practised by the States in 
question, and that this usage is an expression of a right appertaining to  
the State granting asylum and a duty incumbent upon the territorial State. 
This follows from article 38(1)(b) of the statute of the court, which refers 
to international custom “as evidence of a general practice  accepted as 
law”.90
In  the  Case  Concerning  Rights  of  Nationals  of  the  United  States  of 
America  in  Morocco  (France  v.  United  States  of  America),91 and  in 
response to United States’ claims that its consular jurisdiction and other 
capitulatory rights in Morocco were founded upon “custom and usage”, the 
PCIJ ruled that:
In the present case there has not been sufficient evidence to enable the 
court to reach a conclusion that a right to exercise consular jurisdiction 
founded upon custom or usage has been established in such a manner that 
it has become binding on Morocco.92
The proposition that  if  an assertion of a right by a State is regarded by 
affected States as capable of giving rise to a corollary duty, then  opinio  
juris which  is  required  to  consummate  State  practice  into  a  rule  of 
customary international  law will  have been proved appears  problematic. 
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While this may suffice in cases where the creation of particular or regional 
customary law is the issue, it may prove illusory where the formation of 
general  or  universal  customary law is  concerned,  especially  where  only 
some and not  all  the  affected  States  actually  actively  participate  in  the 
creation of a rule.  Nonetheless,  it  is  necessary to  ask what  in  a State’s 
conduct  accounts  for  “assertion  of right”  and what  for  recognition  of a 
“corollary  duty”  in  this  proposition?   These  references  ought  to  be 
transparent  themselves  to  enhance  custom’s  transparency,  coherency, 
consistency and determinacy and predictability.
On the Material Elements of Custom
Hudson’s93 requirements for the determination that a new norm of custom 
has  emerged  have  become  the  backbone  of  academic  comment  on 
customary  international  law.  They  provide  a  useful  launch  pad  for  an 
informed analysis of the material elements of customary international law. 
They are: 
1) concordant practice by a number of States with reference to a type of 
situation falling within the domain of international relations,
2) continuation or repetition of the practice over a considerable period of 
time,
3) conception  that  the  practice  is  required  by,  or  consistent  with, 
prevailing international law, 
4) general acquiescence in the practice by other States, and
5) the  establishment  of  the  presence  of  each  of  these  elements  by  a 
competent international authority. 
Formulations of this tenor are not uncommon in the standard texts.94 What 
is uncommon, though, is agreement by jurists on whether the presence of 
all these elements is a prerequisite to the emergence of rules of customary 
international law. The first requirement is that practice with the quality of 
creating a rule of customary international law must be concordant, that is 
to say it  must be maintained uniformly and consistently by a number of 
States with reference to a type of situation falling within the domain of 
international relations. International tribunals have had occasion to indicate 
the extent of uniformity and consistency required in State conduct for this 
purpose. In the Asylum Case, the ICJ ruled that:
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The  Party which relies  on  a  custom of  this  kind  must  prove  that  this 
custom is established in such a manner that it has become binding on the 
other Party. The Colombian Government must prove that the rule invoked 
by it is in accordance with a uniform and constant usage practised by the 
States  in  question, and  that  this  usage  is  the  expression  of  a  right 
appertaining to the State granting asylum and a duty incumbent on the 
territorial State. This follows from article 38 of the Statute of the court, 
which refers to international  custom “as evidence of a  general  practice 
accepted as law”.95 
Nonetheless,  the  court  does  not  identify  the  threshold  of  “uniformity” 
and/or   “consistency” that  must  be attained before  a declaration  can be 
made that  a  new rule  of  customary international  law has  emerged.  The 
court’s  reference  to  the  relative  idea  of  “substantial”  State  practice 
certainly  does  not  sharply  define  the  parameters  of  custom.  Instead,  it 
spreads them so thinly that what is meant by “substantial” State practice 
has  to  be  elaborated  on  later.  Simple  cases  that  present  little  or  no 
difficulty regarding what is meant by “substantial” State practice do not 
cause  problems.  Difficult  cases  require  greater  specificity  than  that 
suggested  above.  Agreement  on  what  suffices  as  “substantial”  State 
practice will be difficult to reach. The result is that predictability of custom 
suffers,  and  with  it,  its  legitimacy.  To  enhance  the  legitimacy  of  the 
doctrine  of  customary  international  law it  is  necessary  to  ascertain  the 
threshold at which uniformity and consistency of practice combine with the 
requisite  opinio  juris to  result  in  the  creation  of  a  rule  of  customary 
international law. Predictability needs to be manifested also in Hudson’s 
second element of custom, the requirement that the practice relied upon as 
evidence of the emergence of a primary rule of recognition of customary 
international law must be general. How general should it be for regional 
rules and how general for general rules? Equally? 
In determining this question, international tribunals appear to place 
emphasis on the quality of protest and abstention manifested in the wake of 
State practice indicative of claims of the emergence of a nascent norm of 
customary  international  law.  While  abstention  may  be  regarded  as 
indifference, active and substantial protest may undermine the uniformity 
required, and must be examined to see if: 1) it defeats any effort to create a 
rule;  or  2)  it  merely defeats  its  application  to  the  protesting State.  The 
question  whether  at  any  time  abstention  means  acquiescence  or  results 
from economic hardship does not appear to be a relevant consideration in 
the jurisprudence of international tribunals.96 In the Corfu Channel Case97 
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the ICJ imposed on coastal States a duty effectively to watch over their 
territorial waters for any threats to the safety of the Maritime Community. 
This enabled the court to declare the emergence of the customary rule that 
obliges States to warn the Maritime Community in general, and those in 
immediate danger, of the risk they placed themselves in sailing in those of 
their territorial waters they knew to be unsafe. This appears to ignore the 
crucial reality that the world easily divides into affluent and poor States to 
such an extent that what one State may regard as a basic enjoyment, may 
be another’s luxury.98 This division is also reflected in the disproportionate 
distribution  and  enjoyment  of  technological  benefits  reaped  from  the 
unprecedented technological revolution this century. Dictionaries are being 
rewritten,  to  take account  of  phrases  like  “information  superhighways”, 
“micro chip”, “internet”, “the web”, etc. This reflects the present and ever 
advancing possibilities  for  human interaction  in  both private  and public 
life,  particularly  in  the  developed  world.  In  the  developing  world 
communication continues to occur at a snail’s pace. The implication is that, 
where determination that a new norm of customary international law has 
emerged  is  premised  also  on  absence  of  protest  of  developing  nations, 
there is real danger that custom may become the preserve of the developed 
countries.  Were  this  to  happen,  developing  countries’  experience  of 
international  law  would  once  again  be  not  so  pleasant.  Previously, 
international  law was  used  by empire  nations  to  facilitate  colonization, 
oppression and expropriation of wealth  of many present  day developing 
countries. It is only recently that by their numerical strength in organs like 
the United Nations General Assembly that these countries have started to 
contribute to international  law as legal equals with their former colonial 
masters.  Many  developed  States  publish  regularly  national  digests  of 
international law or some such similar bulletin to which reference may be 
made  for  evidence  of  their  practice  on  international  matters.99 The 
American Digest  of  International  Law100 is  one example.  Publications  of 
regional  organisations,  such as The European Union’s Common Foreign 
and  Security  Policy  Department,  are  other  examples.  Notwithstanding 
disputes  about  the  sufficiency  of  State  practice  and  opinio  juris in  the 
determination whether or not a new norm of customary international law 
has  been  formed,  “unlinked  States”  may be  left  out  of  the  process  of 
custom in cases where the “linked States” appear to conduct  themselves 
primarily via modern technologies. No clear evidence of this problem has 
been detected as yet. However, if economic power continues to distribute 
the  gains  of  technological  benefits  to  human interdependence  as  it  has 
always done, the day may not be far off when unlinked States and linked 
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States  experience  a  practical  misunderstanding  over  custom.  Such  a 
misunderstanding would give the impression that custom had become the 
preserve  of  the  wealthy.  This  would  diminish  further  the  legitimacy of 
customary  international  law  because  the  principle  of  legal  equality  of 
Member States of the United Nations should apply also to their opportunity 
to  contribute  to  the  process  of  custom  in  matters  that  affect  them. 
Wolfke’s101 argument  that,  recent  technological  advances  will  serve  to 
speed  up  the  process  of  custom  papers  over  the  imbalance  in  the 
distribution  of  communication  technologies  between  the  affluent  States 
and their poorer companions. In the last fifty years the United Nations has 
grown  from  a  mere  handful  of  States  to  a  community  of  nearly  two 
hundred countries from all continents, with very different habits, cultures 
and ideologies, and with rather dissimilar understandings and expectations 
of international law. This appears to have added complicated nuances to 
custom’s traditional requirement that States ought to exhibit  the material 
elements of custom so that a general, consistent, and uniform State practice 
over a considerably long period of time is established before the emergence 
of a rule can be certified.102 Differentiation between acquiescence that aids 
the emergence of a rule of customary international law and acquiescence 
that certifies typical cultural practice common only to a handful States, and 
which is therefore not intended by them as acquiescence to the emergence 
of rule of customary international law creates further problems. Of course 
this  problem  is  less  likely  to  occur  in  the  creation  of  regional  norms 
because  of  the  geographical  and  often  cultural,  and  developmental 
similarities  amongst  the  concerned  States.  The  ICJ’s  judgment  in  the 
Asylum Case supports this. The court stated that: 
Even if it could be supposed that such a custom existed between certain 
Latin-American States only, it could not be invoked against Peru which, 
far  from  having  by  its  attitude  adhered  to  it,  has,  on  the  contrary, 
repudiated it by refraining from ratifying the Montevideo Conventions of 
1933  and  1939,  which were  the  first  to  include  a  rule  concerning  the 
qualification of the offence in matters of diplomatic asylum.103 
In the Anglo-Norwegian  Fisheries Case, the ICJ observed that:
Although the 10-mile rule has been adopted by certain States both in their 
national law and in their treaties and conventions, and although certain 
arbitral  decisions have applied  it  as between these States,  other States  
have adopted  a different  limit.  Consequently,  the  10-mile rule  has  not 
acquired the authority of a general rule of international law. In any event, 
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the  10-mile  rule  would  appear  to  be  inapplicable  as  against  Norway 
inasmuch  as  she  has  always  opposed any  attempt  to  apply  it  to  the 
Norwegian coast.104 
International  tribunals’  practice  on  the  requirement  of  sufficiency  of 
general  State  practice  does  not  appear  to  have ascertained a recognised 
threshold  at  which  a  nascent  norm matures  into  a  fully-fledged rule  of 
customary  international  law.  New  technologies  that  are  capable  of 
revolutionising interaction between States are consistently emerging. The 
form  a  message  takes  does  not  necessarily  change  its  content. 
Consequently, two facts combine to impair the legitimacy of custom. One 
is that international tribunals appear to pass on every opportunity to make 
clear the levels of sufficiency required for each of the elements of custom 
in order that a nascent norm of custom may be declared to have matured 
into a fully fledged norm of customary international law. Another is that 
the creation of rules of customary law, and technologies which States may 
soon  be  relying  on  to  demonstrate  their  views  on  developments  in 
international life continue to be unevenly distributed among the members 
of the United Nations.  Increasingly the danger grows that the threshold of 
sufficiency required in the formation of a norm of customary international 
law is confined to speculation and not to clarity. Perhaps there is need for 
both the  linked  and the  unlinked States  to  make sure  that  they agree  a 
common platform for exhibiting that practice and  opinio juris related to 
custom. This will have the effect of rejecting any other platform of creating 
customary international  law except  where  regional  custom is  concerned 
because all the countries in a particular region that may be affected by an 
emerging norm of custom may have the same means as the instigators to 
demonstrate their opinions on the particular issue. 
Closely linked to Hudson’s requirement of generality of practice is the 
requirement that the uniform and consistent general practice relied upon as 
evidence of the emergence of a new norm of customary international law 
manifests  these attributes  over time. In the North Sea Continental  Shelf 
Cases, the ICJ stated that:
The passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself a bar 
to  the  formation  of  a  new  rule  of  customary  international  law.  An 
indispensable requirement would be that within the period in question, short 
though it might be, State practice, including that of States whose interests are 
specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform, and 
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should  moreover  have  occurred  in  such  a  way  as  to  show  a  general 
recognition that a rule of law or a legal obligation is involved.105
Recent  advances  in  technology  have  enabled,  and  sometimes  even 
demanded, the creation of “instant rules” of customary international law. 
The legal principle prohibiting the orbiting of nuclear  weapons in space 
vehicles was promulgated by way of joint declarations in 1963 by the two 
nations that had that capability.106 Although this principle was eventually 
incorporated  into  the  provisions  of  the  Space  Treaty  (1967),  it  became 
binding from the moment the declarations  were  made.107 Of course,  this 
was facilitated by the fact that the two States shared mutual interests on the 
matter. If all parties concerned with an issue recognise and accept the need 
for  immediate  regulation  through  customary  international  law  it  seems 
extravagant to want to speculate about whether or not those States have 
maintained that common position for a long time before the proposed norm 
takes effect. Nonetheless, it is manifestation of consistency, transparency, 
determinacy,  predictability  and  coherency  in  all  cases  that  a  norm  of 
customary international  law is  inaugurated that  compels this  analysis  so 
that  if  necessary,  varieties  in  the  process  of  custom  are  not  only 
acknowledged, but also verified and their patterns tested for consistency, 
coherency, determinacy, predictability  and transparency. In this  instance 
the requirement of sufficiency was satisfied by the agreement of the two 
States that had capacity to orbit nuclear weapons in space vehicles, Russia 
and  the  US.  Therefore  generality  meant  all.  What  is  not  clear  yet  is 
whether the requirement of sufficiency of State practice means all in every 
case. Does generality mean all in each case? 
Publicists on Custom
For convenience,  publicists’  writings on custom can be categorised into 
descriptive108 and  prescriptive109 approaches.  The  focus  in  the  former 
category is justification of custom in the international legal system. The 
latter category is not content with merely acknowledging custom as one of 
the  recognised  sources  of  international  law.  It  is  keen  to  demystify 
custom’s  lens  in  order  to  make  the  procedure  of  custom  transparent, 
predictable and determinable. Kirgis’110 theory of custom on a sliding scale, 
and  D’Amato’s111 theory  of  manifest  intent  are  examples  of  the  latter 
approach. Nonetheless, both approaches emphasise and privilege different 
but equally important  aspects of custom. Both approaches are united on 
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what constitutes the formal elements of custom. They are not always united 
on what counts as material elements of custom, and what the threshold of 
sufficiency is or should be for these elements. This problem is perhaps best 
rehearsed by Allot who observes that:
Custom is a, or the major source of law in customary laws. But what do 
we mean when we make this self evident remark, and what sort of source 
is custom? [Custom] =  practice, is what people do; law = norm, is what 
people ought to do. By what mysterious process does the normal become 
the normative? Not every practice engenders a norm; not all custom “is” 
law.112
There is an abundance of literature that reflects jurists’ untiring efforts to 
extricate  custom  from  its  definitional  problems.113 Jennings  and  Watts 
apparently  consider  that  of  the  two formal  elements  of  custom, namely 
State practice and  opinio juris, it is the former rather than the latter that 
really matters. They write that:
However,  the  formulation  in  the  statute  serves  to  emphasise  that  the 
substance of this source of international law is to be found in the practice 
of States. The practice of States in this context embraces not only their 
external conduct with each other, but is also evidenced by such internal 
matters  as  their  domestic  legislation,  judicial  decisions,  diplomatic 
dispatches, internal government memoranda, and ministerial statements in 
Parliaments and elsewhere.114
This  writer  calls  this  the  discounting  approach  to  custom because 
eventually, it inevitably opposes the former position that it is State practice 
and opinio juris that constitute custom. Further, it threatens the legitimacy 
of  customary  international  law by undermining  the  one  distinction  that 
serves  to  separate  legal  custom  from  common  usage.115 If  only  State 
practice mattered in the process of custom, how then could legal custom be 
differentiated from courtesy for example? It is precisely for this reason that 
Jennings and Watts append to the earlier comment that:
A custom is a clear and continuous habit of doing certain actions which 
has grown up  under the aegis of the conviction that these actions are,  
according to international law, obligatory or right. On the other hand, a 
usage is a habit of doing certain actions which has grown up without there 
being the conviction that these actions are, according to international law, 
obligatory or right. Some conduct of states concerning their international 
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relations may therefore be usual without being the outcome of customary 
international law.116
The implication here is that usage is inferior to legal custom, though usage 
may  convert  to  custom  upon  the  establishment  of  the  psychological 
disposition among States that the repetition of such conduct was not due 
only to chance, but to a recognition that it was obligatory. In the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases, the ICJ ruled that: 
Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they 
must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a 
belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of 
law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e. the subjective element, is 
implicit  in the very notion of opinio  juris  sive necessitatis.  The States 
concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to 
a legal obligation. The frequency, or even habitual character of the acts is 
not itself enough.117
The  court’s  proposition  poses  the  question  whether  the  transformation 
from mere usage to legal custom is retrospective. First States promoting a 
nascent  norm of  custom act  as  if  the  idea  were  already binding.  Other 
States  join  them to  make practice  on the  nascent  norm more and more 
general.  When  their  practice  has  reached  the  required  threshold  of 
sufficiency  (still  elusive),  the  nascent  norm  matures  into  a  rule  of 
customary international law and from this time on, the same States adhere 
to the same idea as law. But by what is their initial conduct governed, if it 
is finally, as previous to its crystallisation, still governed by the belief that 
it  is  obligatory?  Kelsen  calls  this  custom’s  “unanswerable  paradox”. 
Kunz118 regards this as “acting in legal error”. Parry119 finds this baffling. 
He writes: “We find that what we have done binds us. We also find that 
that  which we have done in the conviction that  it  is  already binding so 
binds us”.  Allot’s120 conclusion is  that  if  this  is  how rules of customary 
international  law  are  created,  then  custom  is  itself  a  mystery.  In  his 
dissenting opinion in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judge Lachs 
expressed the following view:
To postulate that  all  States,  even those which initiate  a  given practice, 
believe themselves to be acting under a  legal  obligation is  to resort  to 
fiction - and in fact to deny the possibility of developing such rules. For 
the path may indeed start from voluntary, unilateral acts relying on the 
confident expectation that they will find acquiescence or be emulated.121
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This  then  is  the  problem  that  appears  to  have  steadily  corroded  the 
legitimacy of customary international law. This is not a new problem. The 
solutions which have been suggested over the years have served more to 
illustrate the problem than to solve it. For instance, Verdross122 proposed a 
three-stage process which can be summarised as follows:
1) Stage one -  in the absence of fraud, duress, or mistake, one or more 
States  consciously  manifest  particular  practice,  or  make  particular 
claims indicative of self-interest, gain, courtesy, comity, etc.
2) Stage two - in response other States make claims or counter claims, in 
the hope that  those  other States that  are yet to take a stance on the 
matter may be persuaded to reciprocate. At this point, States manifest 
estoppel-like expectations where one or more States’ reliance upon the 
conduct of other States and the States whose conduct is relied upon by 
those  acting  in  a  particular  way  are  regarded  as  bound  by  the 
expectations that their behaviour has induced in others.
3) Stage  three -  the  pattern  of  reliance,  expectation,  and  inducement 
matures and yields a rule of law. 
The conviction on the part of States that they are adhering to an emerging 
customary rule  may then gradually begin to  accompany the practice in 
question. ...  as the practice or  claims become more widespread,  or  are 
acquiesced  in  by  more  States,  so  too  the  conviction  that  the  type  of 
conduct in question is obligatory (ought to be done) or permissible (may 
be done) in the scheme of inter-State relations.123
Verdross thought that his proposal would explain custom forwards rather 
than backwards124 and therefore indicate the precise point at which a rule of 
customary  international  law  is  created.  Verdross  is  elaborate  with  the 
question of custom’s material elements. However, he does not tackle the 
mysterious125 transfiguration  of  usage  into  custom.  In  the  end,  his 
contribution appears to address the legality rather than the legitimacy of 
the doctrine of  customary international  law, invoking in the process  the 
doctrine of estoppel. 
In The Concept of Custom in International Law, D’Amato rejects 
Hudson’s  formulation  of  customary  international  law,126 and  suggests  a 
two-stage process  of  custom instead.127 Clearly,  D’Amato’s  strategy sets 
him on course to address custom’s imponderable paradox.128 It is not just 
the formal aspects of custom that he is concerned with, but also the content 
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of the idea. In place of “usus” he proposes “commitment”; and in place of 
“opinio  juris”,  he  suggests  “articulation”.129 His  main  criticism  of 
Hudson’s list is that it: “… cannot explain how existing laws could change, 
for a change in the law would again by definition be based on practice that 
was not consistent with prevailing law”.130 
Stage one of D’Amato’s proposal involves identifying a claim that 
particular State conduct is motivated by a sense of legal obligation. Stage 
two involves ascertaining whether the determinative force of such a claim 
has  been  enhanced  by  successful  repetition,  consent,  estoppel,  or 
reasonableness.  It is stage two of D’Amato’s proposal  that  is  key to his 
strategy. D’Amato argues that because a State is an artificial entity, it is 
incapable  of  experiencing  consciousness  or  unconsciousness.  Therefore, 
“…  Even  if  we  were  to  substitute  for  the  term  ‘States’  the  national 
decision-makers within those States, the task of proving consciousness of a 
duty would be impossible”.131 Consequently, the second limb of custom - 
opinio juris - can only be a fiction which hinders legal conception of the 
idea of custom. For that reason, custom should be reformulated so that this 
fiction  can  be  left  out,  and  customary  international  law’s  legitimacy 
enhanced. He writes that:
There is no need for the acting State itself, through its officials, to have 
articulated the legal rule. States often do not give official explanations of 
their  conduct,  nor  should  we  expect  them  to  do  so.  A  writer  on 
international law, a court, or an international organization may very well 
provide the qualitative component of custom. But it must be promulgated 
in a place which nation State officials or their counsel would have reason 
to  consult.  The  leading  journals  in  international  law,  the  leading 
textbooks,  reports  of  legal  decisions  affecting  international  law, 
resolutions of international organisations - all these are likely sources for 
the articulation of rules. Diplomatic correspondence is similarly a good 
source.132
However,  if  States  submitted  themselves  to  rules  whose  discovery 
depended solely on what publicists regarded as good law, which publicists 
should be relied upon? Second, the sceptre of States depending on their 
own active research for  their  determination of what  was acceptable  and 
unacceptable behaviour in the international  community appears  onerous. 
What of the poor countries - the majority of which might not afford the 
cost of running, let alone maintaining, such research? The same poor States 
could not afford the services of the good counsel implied in this approach. 
These  practical  difficulties  add  onto  rather  than  diminish  custom’s 
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problems  with  legitimacy.  States  would  be  loathe  to  have  publicists, 
whatever their qualification, tell them what the law is or ought to be. In 
practice,  even  the  most  respected  writers  themselves  are  not  always  in 
agreement on many aspects of the law. Each country would refer only to 
those  writers  that  suited  its  cause.  It  appears  that  this  would  add  onto 
custom’s  legitimacy  deficiencies  rather  than  lessen  them.  For  instance, 
Tunkin’s  view of  custom133 is  not  exactly  the  same as  that  of  Meijer.134 
However,  both  writers  inspire  enthusiasm  on  the  subject.  Such 
disagreements are not limited to the process of custom itself. For instance, 
there is also no agreement among writers on which rules of international 
law are norms of jus cogens. 
Meijers’  thesis  on  custom is  predicated  on  the  extent  to  which 
behaviour  indicative  of  the  process  of  custom  is  ascertainable.135 To 
achieve  that  certainty  custom’s  secondary  rules  of  recognition 
unambiguously  ought  to  identify  that  behaviour.  Meijers  observes  three 
stages in the formation of rules of customary international law. At the first 
stage,  the nascent  rule  takes shape,  though it  does  not  take on its  legal 
character. The emphasis here is on repetition of similar conduct in similar 
situations. He likens the vitality of repetition to custom to the vitality of 
expressiveness  to  the  process  of  treaty  making.  Without  repetition  of 
similar conduct in similar situations there can be no custom and without 
custom there can be no customary law.136 This view is consistent with the 
jurisprudence  of  the  ICJ.  In  the  Asylum  Case,137 the  ICJ  rejected 
Colombia’s claim that a regional rule of customary international law on the 
granting of asylum to fugitives  had  emerged.  It  insisted  that  for  such  a 
determination  to  be  made  it  was  necessary  to  show evidence  of  “… a 
constant and uniform usage”. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,138 
which is probably the ICJ’s most eloquent pronouncement on custom, the 
court referred to this  requirement as “… conduct  amounting to a settled 
practice”. 
While this regularity of practice which points to the emergence of 
a new norm of custom taking shape, occurrences contrary to the nascent 
rule  cannot  be  ruled  out.  However,  this  does  not  mean  that  practice 
supportive of the nascent norm loses its significance. For the nascent norm 
to mature into a fully-fledged norm of customary international law States 
supporting  it  will  just  have  to  persevere.  This  phase  is  akin  to 
parliamentary debates where members of the house opposed to the nascent 
rule on the one hand and those in support of it on the other rehearse their 
positions. The difference between the two lies in that whereas members of 
a national assembly conclude their debate with casting votes for or against 
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the proposed idea, and the actual votes that determine whether or not the 
bill  becomes  law  or  not  concretely  can  be  quantified,  such  legitimacy 
enhancing certainties are not  clear  in this  proposition.  In treaty law, for 
instance,  the  rule  is  that  all  States  taking part  in  the  negotiations  must 
accept  the  text,  though  current  practice  appears  to  favour  consensus139 
unless an international conference is involved. In the latter case, two-thirds 
of  the negotiators  can finalise the  text,  unless of course,  the conference 
participants expressly decide otherwise. Meijers acknowledges this deficit 
of  specificity  in  requiring  mere  generality  of  practice,  repetition  and 
regularity. He wonders whether it is universality or majority practice that is 
required:
As two States, then the requirement of generality naturally means that both 
States take part in the practice. If three States are involved then general 
can also be taken to mean universal. If the rule in making is aimed at six 
States, then it begins to be less clear ... But all nine?140 
In  the  North  Sea  Continental  Shelf  Cases  the  ICJ  stated  that  the 
requirement  of  general  practice  accepted  as  law  was  an  indispensable 
requirement  in  the  process  of  custom.  It  refers  to:  “…  State  practice, 
including that of States whose interests are specifically affected (which) 
should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the 
provision  invoked”.141 The  requirement  that  practice  relied  upon  as 
evidence of the emergence of a norm of customary international law ought 
to be general excludes notions of universal practice. However, instead of 
helping  to  clarify  what  is  meant  by  “general  practice”,  reference  to 
“specially affected States” further complicates the problem. Even if it were 
accepted that it is only some and not all States that would be bound by the 
new rule that by their conduct ought consistently and enduringly to support 
the nascent  norm until  it  matured into a fully fledged rule,142 it  remains 
unclear how many such States ought to be involved before the threshold of 
sufficiency  is  met.  International  tribunals,  including  the  ICJ,  have  not 
shown sufficient  courage conclusively to determine this  point.  Villiger143 
doubts that the “specially affected States” test could do sufficient justice to 
every type of convention (qua customary law). He cites, as examples, the 
rules on humanitarian warfare of the 1949 Geneva Conventions144 and the 
1977  Protocols,145 and  the  1961  and  1963  Vienna  Conventions  on 
diplomatic relations,146 which are surely of concern to every State. He asks 
the question whether  it  is  possible  in all  cases to assess  the practice  of 
“affected” States. He writes:
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The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is of import to all 
States, since all States possess the capacity to conclude treaties (article 6 
of the Vienna Convention) and virtually all have done so, thereby applying 
the law of treaties. The very fact that a large number of States participate, 
take the floor, and vote (or establish a consensus) at a conference implies 
a general interest in the matters implied.147
The  Third  United  Nations  Conference  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea’s  quasi 
universal participation,148 shows difficulties with the ICJ’s requirement of 
“specially  affected”  States  in  the  process  of  custom  because  that 
conference illustrated that the law of the sea is no longer the preserve of 
maritime powers alone.149
Stage two of Meijers’ formulation refers to the question whether it 
is possible to determine the actual point at which a new rule of customary 
international  law  could  be  said  to  have  been  formed.  Meijer’  appears 
apologetic and irresolute. He writes that: 
The preciseness which is usually achieved in treaty law as to the moment at which 
the text becomes definitive ... will hardly ever occur in customary law. This in no 
way means that when the required period of time has elapsed, one will still be 
uncertain as to whether a rule has emerged.150
But if this same preciseness is central to the transparency, determinacy and 
predictability of law creation through treaty process, its establishment in 
custom appears logical and practical especially as custom is under so much 
criticism. 
Walden151 approaches the problem of customary international law’s 
legitimacy deficit robustly. He rejects outright both the view of customary 
international  law that privileges the importance of  opinio juris over any 
other aspect  of that  process, and the tacit  consent  theory of custom. He 
argues  that  neither  of  these  views  adequately  explains  the  process  of 
custom though each of them stresses an important aspect it. According to 
Walden: “The tacit consent theory (stresses) that custom is a law making 
process,  and  the  opinio  juris theory  (stresses)  that  there  must  be  some 
difference between customary law and practices that do not express, or do 
not  give  rise  to  law”.152  Walden  appears  to  say that  the  answer  to  the 
“unanswerable paradox” lies in reformulating it  so that both the consent 
and  the  opinio  juris theories  are  reconciled.153 He  argues  that  the 
formulation of custom in most legal systems, including the international 
legal  system,  involves  two  different  sets  of  rules,  and  that  custom’s 
30  Legitimacy Deficit in Custom
legitimacy may be revamped only by altering one of these sets,  but not 
necessarily both. The first, the secondary rules of recognition, specify the 
conditions  under  which  customary  laws  can  be  created.  These  can 
themselves  be  customary,  or  have  a  different  origin.  The  second,  the 
primary rules are those rules created under the operation of the first set of 
rules. To modify custom the primary rules created by the exercise of the 
powers mentioned in the secondary rules of recognition can be abrogated 
altogether, or varied by the further exercise of the same powers, or the SR 
themselves may be changed.  While Hart154 focused on the need to ascertain 
secondary rules that governed how legal rules of a society were formed, 
and therefore misled himself into concluding that international law was not 
law, Walden correctly focuses on the question how legal custom is created 
in  a  society  whose  legal  system lists  custom as  one  of  law’s  creating 
agents. In primitive societies, determination of the existence or absence of 
a rule of customary international  law is  not  necessary.155 However, once 
secondary  rules  of  recognition  are  introduced,  a  court  not  only  has  to 
decide whether a rule of custom has been breached in each case, but also 
whether, following the secondary rules of recognition, the rule claimed to 
have been breached actually exists. According to Walden:
To answer this, it will have to apply rules specifying what kind of conduct, 
carried out by whom, and over what period, can give rise to such a rule. 
Secondly, it will have to decide to what individuals the rule applies. (This) 
immediately involves the introduction of secondary rules regulating the 
recognition and scope of application of the customary rules.156
Following  on  from  this  observation  Walden  tackles  custom’s 
“imponderable  paradox”,  that  is,  by  what  mystery  does  common usage 
transform into legal custom? Perhaps because of his seemingly excessive 
reliance on criticism of Hart to make his own point, he sets off by referring 
to Hart’s argument that custom is a tool of primitive societies where in the 
absence of positive law people rely on shared behavioural expectations.157 
He  concludes  that  therefore,  customary  law  is  created:  “…  on  the 
performance  by  a  specified  person  or  body  of  a  specialised  act  which 
stipulates a certain course of conduct, (and) most people generally behave 
in the manner so stipulated”.158 But, technically speaking, the international 
legal system is not primitive in the Hart sense, because only a primitive 
society operates on customary rules that do not point or belong to a legal 
system characterised by secondary rules of recognition. Nothing holds the 
primary rules together in a primitive society particularly because there are 
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no secondary rules  to  identify  and  claim as  belonging  to  their  body of 
rules,  any  of  the  primitive  society’s  “rules”  if  they  may be  called  so. 
Grounding his formulation of custom on a premise that is so inconsistent 
with the reality about the international legal system is problematic because 
he concedes that the international legal system is itself based on both the 
secondary  rules  of  recognition,  and  the  primary  rules  of  recognition.159 
Even if this technical error were to be disregarded, this approach appears 
problematic also in that it regards the creation of custom as a privilege of a 
“Council of Elders” who wield customary legislative authority. 
As an illustration, one may imagine a primitive society in which customary 
legislative powers are conferred on a Council of Elders. ... on issuing of 
prescriptions  in  the  recognised  manner  by  the  council  of  elders  most 
people  generally  comply  with  such  prescriptions.  Here,  the  issuing  of 
prescriptions in the recognised manner is the “performance of a specified 
act which stipulates a certain course of conduct”. The Council of Elders is 
the  “specified  person  or  body”;  and  the  fact  that  there  is  general 
compliance with such prescriptions is an instance of most people generally 
behaving in the manner so indicated.160
This is confusing because custom and legislation are separate processes of 
law  creation.  Because  the  international  legal  system  does  not  have  a 
legislative  assembly,  reference  to  a  person  or  body  of  persons  with 
capacity  to  make  rules  contradicts  the  notion  of  custom as  previously 
framed.161 For  this  reason,  this  approach  leaves  unattended  custom’s 
paradox.  Both  Byers’162 and  the  International  Law  Association  (ILA) 
Committee on the Formation of Custom perceive the adoption of a multi-
disciplinary  approach  to  custom  as  a  possible  way  to  resolving  the 
legitimacy deficit in custom.
The ILA Committee on Formation of General International Law
Although  its  work  does  not  have  an  immediate  legal  significance  for 
States,  the  International  Law Association’s  contribution  to  research  on 
international law is immense and has a unique usefulness in that it provides 
a  “think-tank”  for  international  law  practice.  Established  at  the 
Association’s  Sixty-second  conference  held  in  Seoul  in  1986,  the 
Committee on The Formation of Rules of General International Law was 
tasked with studying custom - the process by which rules of international 
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law  are  created.163 In  its  first  report  Mendelson,  the  rapporteur of  the 
Committee,  lists  the  topics  that  shall  be  followed by the  Committee  in 
discharging its task.164 It seems to the Committee that there is not one, but 
several modes of customary international law. In the paradigm case, one 
State makes a new claim, for example the Truman Proclamation on rights 
to the continental shelf. Publicly, justifications for such a claim are made. 
These consist in assessing the reasonableness of the claim in the light of 
general  principles  of  international  law.  Other  States,  particularly  those 
whose interests are affected acquiesce to the claim. Immediately, sets of 
bilateral  relations  premised  on  doctrines  of  recognition,  estoppel  and 
acquiescence emerge. These “other States” make similar claims. The State 
that first  made the claim, together with a host of other “new respondent 
States”  publicly  accept  that  claim  as  valid.  The  content  of  the  claim 
becomes so widely practised that an opinio juris can be inferred, and later 
claims and acquiescence by other States are regarded as being consistent 
with the new primary rule of customary international law.
The  Committee  writes  that  there  are  several  variations  to  the 
paradigm case. In what we shall for convenience’s sake refer to as the first 
variable,  the  Committee  observes  that  norms of  customary international 
law can be created through treaty. Multilateral treaties affect custom in two 
ways.  The  first  is  by  codifying  existing  primary  rules  of  customary 
international law. Secondly, they can give rise to the creation of new rules 
of  customary international  law in situations  where  for  instance  a  treaty 
provision was intended, to grow into a norm of customary international law 
affecting also those States not parties to the relevant treaty. The North Sea 
Continental  Shelf  Cases165 are  instructive.  In  the  Committee’s  second 
variable to the paradigm case, a series of bilateral treaties on the same or 
similar  subject  appear  to  be  capable  of  creating  primary  rules  of 
recognition of customary international law. The Committee’s third variable 
looks at the possibility that United Nations General Assembly resolutions 
can give rise to the emergence of norms of customary international law. 
Although the Committee qualifies its views by stating that: “… Variants 1-
3 are to a greater or lesser extent controversial …”, the fact that it commits 
Committee  time to  them, even if  it  is  only to clear  the  air  so to speak, 
demonstrates  the  depth  of  legitimacy  deficiencies  in  the  doctrine  of 
custom. In its first working session members took turns to emphasise the 
extent of these deficiencies perhaps as a means of squaring themselves up 
for the task ahead. According to the Chairman, Zemanek (Austria): “Until 
recently, however, international bodies have avoided tackling the creation 
of customary law because of the complexity of the process and because of 
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the dissonance of the theories explaining its formation and validity”. The 
rapporteur,  Mendelson  (UK)  observed  that:  “The  formation  of  general 
customary  international  law  is  a  highly  controversial  topic  on  which 
virtually  every  international  lawyer  has  a  theory.  Quite  a  number  of 
theories exist, and have been in the field for some time. These differences 
are not only the result of political and ideological disagreements; scholars 
with the same general views and background sometimes differ strongly on 
the present topic”. Mrazek (Czechoslovakia) stated that: “The creation of 
customary law is a most complicated problem. ... it can be hardly imagined 
without the manifestation of the wills of States, without the expression of 
their attitudes, without their consensus”. Murase (Japan) regretted that: “At 
present,  there is a serious confusion about  the formation,  existence, and 
non-existence of customary norms and the function of a customary rule, 
and so on. In discussing these problems, people have different images of 
customary  law,  with  different  conceptions,  and  they  are  not  really 
communicating anything to each other, even when they are using the same 
language”. Wolfke, (Poland) thought that:
The topicality of the subject of international custom-formation consists not 
so much in the importance of this international law-making instrument but 
rather in the necessity to clarify the growing confusion in the theory on 
conditions of the formation of rules of customary international law.166
 There is no record of the Committee’s work in the Association’s report of 
the Sixty-fourth Conference held at Broadbeach, in 1990.167 The report of 
the Association’s Sixty-fifth Conference held at Cairo merely notes that the 
Committee  on  Customary  International  law  has  requested  national 
branches  of  the  Association  to  supply  the  Committee  with  available 
material on the national practice relating to matters under consideration by 
it.168 There is no record of the Committee’s work in the Association’s report 
of  the  Sixty-sixth  Conference  held  at  Buenos  Aires  1n  1994.169 The 
Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International Law, as 
it  is  formally  called,  reported  on  its  work  at  the  Association’s  Sixty-
seventh Conference  held at  Helsinki  in  1996.170 The  Committee’s  report 
focused on opinio juris, the second limb of custom. Most members in the 
Committee agreed with the rapporteur that: 
Whether or  not customary rules emerged in the past  in a haphazard or 
spontaneous  way,  much  customary  law  today  emerges  as  a  result  of 
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careful  calculation  on  the  part  of  its  instigators  and  is  thus  far  from 
spontaneous.171
This  was  opposed,  and  correctly  so,  by  Wolfke  who  argued  that:  “… 
calculated custom-making, if not excluded, is rare and difficult to prove”. 
Both of  these  ideas  are  fascinating not  least  because  they revert  to  the 
question:  who makes the  law that  governs  international  relations?  Both 
points shall  be considered initially in Chapter Two, which examines the 
presumptions  underlying  article  38(1)(b),  and  more  intensely  in  all 
Chapters of Part II. The Committee agreed that while some cases required 
evidence of  opinio juris to be shown, others did not. But article 38(1)(b) 
evidently requires evidence of both opinio juris and State practice before a 
declaration can be made that a new norm of customary international law 
has been formed. 
Beyond  the  ILA  Committee  on  Formation  of  Customary 
International  Law’s  paradigm  and  its  three  variables  lurk  two  other 
possibilities. The first reflects what conveniently may be described as “new 
thinking” in customary international law, also evidenced in the “package 
deal approach” to concluding international conferences seen at the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (1973). Package dealing 
appears to countenance the emergence of rules of customary international 
law without looking for evidence of general, continuous State practice and 
opinio juris.172 Mahmoudi writes that: 
The  two  procedural  innovations  of  package  deal  and  consensus  may 
render  it  necessary to  put  any new customary law generated  from the 
negotiations at the Conference in a different category. These new methods 
of lawmaking have certainly made it more difficult to ascertain when and 
how the law is laid down.173 
At that Conference, consensus on the legal limit of the width of territorial 
seas  was evidenced  by unequivocal  State  practice  in the  Conference by 
reference to already enacted national laws. The concept of transit passage 
was  designed  and  presented  by  the  great  maritime  powers  in  order  to 
guarantee the continuation of free navigation through straits - the package. 
Mahmoudi  writes  that  although  it  lacked  evidence  of  general  State 
practice, and was even contested by the strait States as a clear violation of 
the fundamental principle of the sovereignty of the coastal State over its 
territorial sea and although that attitude did not genuinely change in the 
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course of the negotiations: “… it was finally overruled by the compromise 
resulting from the package deal mechanism”.174
The  second  appears  to  stem  from  the  ICJ’s  judgment  in  the 
Nicaragua Case (Jurisdiction and Admissibility).175 The question whether 
the court had jurisdiction to determine this case arose because in accepting 
the court’s  compulsory jurisdiction under the Optional  Clause,176 the US 
entered a reservation excluding from that acceptance, among other things, 
disputes  arising  under  multilateral  treaties  unless,  (1)  all  parties  to  the 
treaty affected by the decision were also parties to the case before the ICJ, 
or (2) the US accepted by special agreement the ICJ’s jurisdiction.177 In one 
of its rulings in this issue, the court held that: “… Although the provisions 
of the United Nations Charter relevant here subsume and supervene related 
principles  of  customary and general  international  law”,  the  rules  of  the 
Charter of the United Nations, and those of customary international law 
were not completely coterminous.178 The ICJ deployed the argument that: 
A State  may accept  a  rule  contained in a  treaty not  simply because  it 
favours  the  application  of  the  rule  itself,  but  also  because  the  treaty 
establishes what the State regards as desirable institutions or mechanisms 
to ensure implementation of the rules.179 
Therefore, similar primary rules of recognition of customary international 
law and  treaty  could  exist  alongside  each  other.  Full  discussion  of  the 
problems  resulting  from  the  court’s  reasoning  in  this  case  occurs  in 
Chapter Eight. Nonetheless, it must be noted that the court concluded by 
suggesting  that  it  could  apply  United  Nations  Charter  provisions  as 
customary international law because: 
… the Charter gave expression in this field to principles already present in 
customary  international  law,  and  that  law has  in  the  subsequent  four 
decades developed under the influence of the Charter to such an extent 
that  a  number of  rules contained in the Charter  have acquired a  status 
independent of it.180 
The foregoing discussion points to a lack of textual determinacy on what 
passes for customary international law and what does not.  The fact  that 
there are several, even rival ways of accounting for the emergence of a rule 
of customary international law appears to be the reason why custom’s lens 
appears opaque. Other factors that directly or indirectly might be impairing 
custom’s  legitimacy are  the  ideas  of  obligation  and  jurisdiction.  These 
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factors must also be examined for clues on what needs to be done to cure 
custom of its legitimacy deficit.
Customary International Law and Obligation
Questions of obligation arise not only in matters theoretical,  but also in 
matters practical such as whether a rule of law has emerged or has been 
terminated; or whether an event is a violation or a precedent; or whether 
practice  under a treaty is  accepted as law or not.  Schachter  identifies  a 
baker’s dozen of theories that attempt to explain the basis of obligation in 
the  international  legal  system.181 However,  these  theories  represent  what 
Brierly regards as the two traditional and rival explanations of the basis of 
obligation  in  international  law,  namely,  the  doctrine  of  natural  or 
fundamental rights of States, and the doctrine of State consent.182 
The doctrine of consent’s influence on international law has very 
much to do with the central place allowed to the notions of sovereignty and 
non-interference in the domestic affairs of States in the international legal 
system. Nonetheless, in its own right, the doctrine of consent has become 
so well entrenched in international life and is actively operative that one 
does not need to prove its existence. In the creation of rules of customary 
international law, States appear to invoke it selectively depending on their 
self-interest, leading some to talk about a tacit consent theory of custom 
and stretching the idea itself. However, to say that tacit consent explains 
the process of custom is to violate customary law’s power to obligate its 
addressees. 
Positivism and Obligation
Austin183 argues  that  a  legal  system properly  so  called,  depends  for  its 
validity on an all powerful sovereign capable of imposing his/her will over 
all of his/her subjects, and owes no such obedience to anyone else. This 
perspective  of  a  legal  system  raises  the  question  much  hated  by  tacit 
consent theorists, that is that, if the all powerful sovereign is a legal despot 
that  cannot  be  stopped  by  anyone  else,  by  what  power  is  the  despot 
obligated  in  international  law  which  regulates  sovereign  independent 
States?  It has been suggested that  a  superior  will  exists  in international 
society, and it is from this will that the rules of public international law 
result.184 This  “will”  originates  from  a  Vereinbarung  (traite-loi) and  a 
Vertrag (traite-contract). A Vereinbarung exists when States enter into an 
agreement  imposing  parallel  or  identical  obligations  on  themselves.  A 
Vertrag, exists on the other hand, when the agreement imposes different 
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reciprocal  obligations  on  the  Parties.  It  is  contended  that  only  a 
Vereinbarung can be a source of law (objectives recht). A vertrag can only 
be a source of rights (subjectives recht).185 But why should a vereinbarung 
give rise to a common will that is superior to, and different from the wills 
of  the  individual  States  composing  it?  An  inherent  weakness  in  this 
argument is that it creates the illusion that a treaty (a vereinbarung), gives 
a new will, separate and superior to the one that brought the contracting 
parties to the negotiating table - the myth of the juridical person capable of 
capping the absolute sovereignty of the State. If this were the case, then 
one would have in every case to affirm the existence of many international 
juridical  persons,  one  for  each vereinbarung,  and  whose  task  though 
limited but extremely important is to be some kind of international legal 
person  summoned  to  create  international  law  as  a 
volkerrechtssetzzungssubjekt properly so called.186 It must  be emphasised 
that a theory of customary international law that depends on a proliferation 
of imaginary, abstract legal entities has little to commend it. Its obligatory 
authority will be scattered and perhaps difficult to establish each time the 
existence or origin of a norm is questioned.
The  argument  that  tacit  consent  is  the  basis  of  obligation  in 
customary international law is premised on the view that agreement is the 
only possible  source  of  international  law. Proponents of  this  idea  argue 
that: “… if States are equal,  and if there exists no superior dictating his 
laws  to  them,  nor  any  majority  power,  then  one  can  only  reach  the 
conclusion that there can be no international law without concordant wills, 
without a treaty”.187 Such arguments risk substituting express contracts for 
rules of customary international law. They reflect what Lauterpacht calls a 
desperate effort by some positivist writers to deny the private character of 
the institution of contract.
 
It  belongs,  they  say,  to  the  domain  of  general  jurisprudence.  The 
conception  of  general  jurisprudence  is  here  frequently  used  for  the 
purpose  of  explaining  an  otherwise  insurmountable  difficulty,  namely, 
how  it  can  be  that  the  consensus  of  the  parties  is  not  essential  in 
international treaties.188
This attempt is made hollow by its failure to account for the source of the 
agreement’s binding authority. Its proponents are happy to conclude that 
because  consent  is  the  only  conceivable  source  of  international  law,  it 
follows that custom must be understood as tacit agreement, regardless of 
the fact that that conclusion is incongruent with the substantive definition 
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of custom.189 Tunkin, who is perhaps the most ardent among contemporary 
tacit  consent  theorists,  argues  that  only  the  tacit  consent  theory  of 
customary international law is a correct reading of article 38(1)(b) of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice. He writes that:
Formation  of  a  custom190 constitutes  a  definite  stage  in  the  process  of 
formation of a norm of customary international law. The consummation of 
this process is the recognition by the States of the custom as juridically 
binding, in other words, recognition of a customary rule of a conduct as a 
norm of international law. This is precisely the interpretation to be given, 
in our opinion, to point (b) of article 38 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, according to which one of the sources of international 
law is international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law.191 
Tunkin  is  not  concerned  about  the  effect  opinio  juris has  on  such  a 
conception of customary international law in spite of the fact that he does 
not  explain  what  compels  States  to  defer  to  a  nascent  norm before  it 
matures  into  a  fully  fledged  norm  of  customary  international  law.  He 
insulates from analysis any controversies inherent in article 38(1)(b). He 
writes that: “… The question of recognition of practice as a norm of law, 
or opinio juris is undialectical”.192 While he concedes that he cannot legally 
justify such a conception of customary international law, he insists that:
 
The creation of  a  customary norm of  international  law is  an historical 
process; the elements of the norm of law evolve gradually.  Opinio juris 
confirms  that  States  regard  this  or  that  customary  norm as  juridically 
binding. When other  States too express  a  will  in this direction, a  tacit 
agreement is formed to recognise the tacit rule as a norm of law.193 
One problem with this argument is that it does not account for the creation 
of universal rules of customary international law, which do not depend for 
their creation on their acceptance by every State. Yet because these rules 
are universal, they address all subjects of the international legal system. It 
cannot be said that until 1993, South Africa had given its tacit consent to 
be bound by the general rule that apartheid was a crime against humanity. 
Yet in suffering the consequences of not accepting that rule, South Africa 
was bound by it even if it had not, as Tunkin suggests, tacitly accepted it. 
His  argument  also  implies  that  a  rule  of  customary international  law is 
binding on a State only if the State, by its own acts, has participated in the 
creation  of  the  particular  rule.  Such  an  argument  must  concede  that 
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universal rules will always be hard to find, or else face up to criticism that 
it assumes an idealistic co-operation amongst Member States of the United 
Nations. According to King, the reality is that: “Although man has learnt to 
fly  the  skies  like  birds  and  to  swim the  oceans  like  fish  and  to  build 
gigantic bridges and towers that challenge the skies, man has not learnt to 
live  together”.194 To  the  extent  that  the  tacit  consent  theory  of  custom 
makes  universal  acceptance  of  a  nascent  rule  a  precondition  to  the 
emergence of a universal rule of customary international law it is difficult 
to see how nearly two hundred members of the United Nations could all 
agree on any one issue. Yet universal rules of customary international law 
exist and do obligate even those States that previously did not consent to 
them. Therefore  the  tacit  consent  theory of customary international  law 
preferred by Tunkin appears to introduce in legal discourse what Brierly 
describes as: 
…  the  virtual  denial  of  the  existence  of  any  universal system  of 
international law, for to be admitted into such a system a rule must have 
been consented to by every State, and this is both an improbable state of 
affairs in itself and also one which it would hardly ever be practicable to 
demonstrate even if it existed.195 
Jennings  and  Watts  write  that  the  requirement  of  common  consent  of 
States  means that  the express  or tacit  consent  of  such an overwhelming 
majority  of  States  is  sought:  “…  so  that  those  who  dissent  are  of  no 
importance whatever, and disappear totally from the view of one who looks 
for the will of the community as an entity in contradistinction to the wills 
of its single members”.196 This raises also the question whether the majority 
have the right to impose their will on the minority - a type of tyranny of the 
majority over a minority. Brierly writes conclusively that:
It is not disputed that there is a certain sense in which legal obligation may 
be said to arise ex consensu; the obligations of a contract in civil law, or of 
a treaty in international law, clearly arise in that way. But a contract or a 
treaty is capable of having this juridical effect only because there exists an 
underlying general rule of law to the effect  pacta sunt servanda and we 
may well speak of a legal obligation as consensual, meaning only that the 
occasion out of which it arises is a consensus of parties, and not intending 
to imply that its ultimate basis, the rule of law which gives binding effect 
to the consensus, is itself consensual in nature.197
Therefore,  if  tacit  consent  means the  same as implied agreement,  it  can 
never be the basis upon which international law is based because the idea 
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that a quasi contractual obligation can arise out of a real agreement of any 
kind is ludicrous.198  So too must any attempt to explain custom on tacit 
consent lines.199 It would be unwise to dismiss altogether and out of hand 
the use of the word consent in a discussion of the basis of obligation in 
customary international law. Brierly writes that the correct interpretation of 
the meaning of consent in the international legal system, an interpretation 
which this writer accepts, is that the consent referred to is: 
… an occasion on which the law for some reason of policy declares that 
an agreement is to be imagined. This is clearly the sense in which we are 
to understand the proposition that international law arises from the consent 
of nations, express or imagined.200 
Therefore, the tacit consent theory of custom is practically and technically 
unworkable.
Practical and Technical Objections to the Tacit Consent Theory of Custom
Practically speaking, the tacit consent theory of custom does explain what 
compels States to behave as they do prior to the consummation of State 
practice and opinio juris. Secondly, it is not correct to say, as proponents 
of this theory suggest, that rules of customary international law apply only 
to those States that consented to its creation. While that may be the case 
with regional (particular) rules of customary international law, that is the 
exception  and  not  the  general  rule  because  universal  (general)  rules  of 
customary international law apply to all the members of the international 
community, including those that might even have protested against  their 
creation in the first place - the Committee on the Formation of Customary 
International Law paradigm case.201 Further, as a precondition to taking up 
membership of the United Nations, emerging States accept that they shall 
adhere to the full  stock of customary international  law applicable at the 
time of joining even though they might not have participated in its creation. 
Waldock writes that: 
No State  has  ever  argued  before  the  court  that  it  was exempt  from a 
general customary rule simply because it was a new State that objected to 
the rule. In the Right of Passage Case, for example, it never occurred to 
India to meet Portugal’s contention as to a right of passage to enclaves by 
saying that she was a new State; nor did Poland, new-born after the second 
world war, ever make such a claim in any of her many cases before the 
Permanent Court.202 
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Certain community values  may be so fundamental  that  the  international 
community cannot afford to jeopardise them by waiting for the consent of 
States  dragging  their  feet.  The  need  to  press  in  a  certain  direction  for 
communal benefit203 very often outweighs waiting for the express consent 
of every State. 
Technically speaking, if  States are bound only by those rules of 
customary international law that they have consented to, it does not follow 
that  they are  bound only towards  those  States  that  have shown similar 
consent towards the same rules as the tacit theory makes out. This theory 
perhaps confuses the idea of consent with that of contract. However, the 
fact is that consent is not the same as contract. Such shortcomings do not 
however nullify positivism’s service to international law. Brierly correctly 
observes that it was positivism that helped draw the positivist distinction 
between  law  and  ethics.204 Much  later  in  his  treatise  on  the  basis  of 
obligation, Brierly celebrates positivism’s contribution to the development 
of the international legal system, writing that:
The  truth  is  that  positivism  has  done  a  much-needed  service  to 
international law by its clear insistence on two points: (1) that what the 
law is and what it ought to be are not always and necessarily the same; and 
(2) that we can discover the former by examining international practice 
and endeavouring to note the principles upon which practice is based, and 
in no other way. But positivism is false to its own professions when it 
implies that the law can be reduced to a set of formulated propositions, for 
it  fails  to  observe  that  international  practice  itself  habitually  admits 
recourse  to  natural  law or  reason;  and  it  exceeds  its  function  when it 
regards itself as a system of legal philosophy, teaching that obligation can 
find its ultimate source in the consenting wills of the subjects of law.205
It would be wrong therefore to regard the tacit consent theory as the basis 
of  obligation  for  rules  of  customary  international  law  because  it  lacks 
coherence itself.  Even if  it  were accepted that  it  was coherent,  the tacit 
consent theory’s coherence does not circumscribe the process of custom 
for it to be regarded as an adequate description of that process. Indeed, it is 
its failure to inscribe custom under its doctrine that costs it a place in the 
search for a theory of obligation in international law.
Another  factor  that  directly  or  indirectly  may  be  impairing 
custom’s  transparency,  consistency,  coherency,  determinacy  and 
predictability is the application of the idea of jurisdiction. 
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Jurisdiction, Obligation and Customary International Law
The Statute of the ICJ makes it plain that the court’s jurisdiction depends 
on the consent of States.206 It is important to distinguish between the source 
of  the court’s  jurisdiction and the application of it.  Article  36(2) of the 
Statute of the ICJ does not say that States may confer jurisdiction on the 
court in all cases which the parties refer to it. It states that:
States  Parties  to  the  present  Statute  may at  any time declare  that  they 
recognise as  compulsory ipso  facto  and  without  special  agreement,  in 
relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction  
of the court in all legal disputes concerning the four specified categories 
of matters.207
The judicial power of the ICJ is conferred on it once and for all by this 
Statute. Therefore, is wrong to imagine that the judicial power of the court 
is bestowed upon it  occasionally by litigating States.  Article 36 is not a 
conferral of jurisdiction on the court, but rather an acceptance, by way of 
recognition, of the jurisdiction of the court, a jurisdiction which the court 
was  fully  clothed  with  at  its  inception  by  virtue  of  its  constituent 
instrument.208 It is the application of the court’s inherent jurisdiction which 
is dependent  on the consent of States. Shahabuddeen writes that: 
… The judicial power so given to the court by its statute is given subject 
to a condition, this condition being that the power should not be exercised 
in relation to a State without its consent to that exercise.209  
Thus,  in  the  Case  Concerning  Maritime  Delimitation  and  Territorial 
Questions  Between  Qatar  and  Bahrain  (Qatar  v.  Bahrain),210 the  court 
convened  three  times  to  consider  whether  or  not  it  had  jurisdiction  to 
entertain the admissibility of the application.211 By its Order of 11th October 
1991, the court decided that written pleadings should first be addressed to 
the questions of jurisdiction of the court to entertain the dispute, and of the 
admissibility of the application. Following this, the court ruled on 1st July 
1994, that:
The exchanges of letters of December 1987 between the King of Saudi 
Arabia and the Amirs of Qatar and Bahrain, and the minutes signed at 
Doha  on  25th December  1990,  were  international  agreements  creating 
rights  and  obligations  for  the  Parties,  and  that,  by  the  terms of  those 
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agreements, the Parties had undertaken to submit to it the whole of the 
dispute between them, as circumscribed by the “Bahrain formula”.212
The significance of the requirement that both parties to a dispute must have 
accepted the  court’s  jurisdiction over their  dispute  before  the  court  can 
determine  whether  or  not  the  disputants  have  a  justiceable  problem is 
perhaps summed up by judge Koroma. In his dissenting opinion the judge 
argues that because Bahrain had not recognised the court’s jurisdiction, the 
court had no jurisdiction.213 In the Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. 
Australia),214 the  ICJ  held  that  because  a  decision  on  whether  or  not 
Australia had incurred international responsibility by negotiating the terms 
of exploiting the Timor Gap with Indonesia  required the ICJ to make a 
prior  decision  on the  legality  of  Indonesia’s  invasion  of  East  Timor  in 
1975, and her continued presence in that territory to the material time, the 
case  was  inadmissible  as  Indonesia  had  not  consented  to  the  automatic 
jurisdiction of the court under article 36, nor had she accepted the court’s 
jurisdiction  in  the  particular  dispute  -  on  an  ad  hoc  basis.215   Similar 
reasoning is to be found in Rolin’s submissions on behalf of Iran in the 
Anglo Iranian Case. He remarked that:
It is doubtless true that, when the court decides a case in order to settle a 
dispute,  it  is  acting  ...  in  pursuance  of  an  authorisation  given  by  the 
parties. However, while it is acting in pursuance of an authorisation given 
by the parties, its action is taken by virtue of the powers conferred upon it 
by the Charter and by its Statute.216 
If this  is  not a misreading of article 36 it  must  follow that  when States 
invoke  this  provision,  what  they  are  doing  is  merely  accepting  the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ and not, it must be emphasised, conferring a non-
existent  jurisdiction  on the  court.  States  can declare  this  recognition  by 
either executing the procedure laid out in article 36 (2) of the Statute of the 
ICJ, or by authorising it to exercise its jurisdiction in an individual case. 
Although  the  first  option  seems  an  obvious  first  choice,  State  practice 
indicates  that  the  second option  is  more popular.  This  is  not  surprising 
given the fact that States generally appear loathe to surrender away part of 
their sovereign rights to international institutions.217 They prefer instead to 
accept jurisdiction of the ICJ for limited specific bilateral or multilateral 
agreements. There are over two hundred and fifty bilateral and multilateral 
treaties  which  direct  that  cases  concerning  the  application  and 
interpretation of those treaties shall be referred to arbitration of the ICJ or 
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some such international  or regional  tribunal.218 Recent  examples  of  such 
treaties include the (1992) United Nations Rio de Janeiro Convention on 
Biological  Diversity,219 the  (1993)  United  Nations  Paris  Convention  on 
Chemical Weapons,220 and the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages.221 Of the cases pending before the ICJ in 1995, five of them, 
including  that  on  the  Lockerbie  incident,222 and  that  on  the  Vincennes 
incident,223 relied on similar Conventions to commit them under that court’s 
jurisdiction. Of the ICJ’s jurisdiction, Judge Gillaume writes that: 
The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice has not changed since 
1945. ... But whatever the basis of the court’s jurisdiction, it is clear that 
its activity remains dependent on the will of States. It is intrinsically linked 
with the trust that governments and international  organizations place in 
international law and justice.224
The  idea  that  the  consent  of  States  forms  the  source  of  the  court’s 
jurisdiction is a mischievous attempt to clothe the doctrine of consent with 
a cloak bigger than its stature. Arguments that new members of the United 
Nations should be handed a clean slate so that they can pick and choose 
what pre-existing rules they will be bound by have not changed practice on 
the matter. The occasion of taking up membership with the United Nations 
is itself a demonstration that the new member accepts the common rules of 
the organisation regardless of the fact that it did not have the opportunity to 
contribute to their creation. 
These two examples illustrate that the view that consent  per se is 
the basis of obligation as tacit consent theorists would have us believe, is 
not entirely correct. The occasion creating obligation sometimes manifests 
itself in express assent to individual rules, and sometimes manifests itself 
with  no  such  express  consent.  It  is  therefore  important  to  distinguish 
between occasions that have the effect of creating binding obligations on 
States in contradistinction to occasions that do not have that effect.
Occasion Importing Obligation in Customary International Law
Schachter  begins  his  search  for  what  he  calls  the  “correct”  basis  of 
obligation in international law by identifying  six factors that have added to 
the indeterminacy of obligation in the international legal system in recent 
years: 
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1) The  much-lauded  quasi-legislative  activity  by  the  United  Nations 
General Assembly and other United Nations bodies that has negatively 
impacted  the  basis  of  obligation  particularly  because  this  so-called 
quasi-legislation  has  been  purported  to  have  capacity  to  create 
obligatory norms.225 
2) Implicit  understandings  and  unilateral  actions,  commonly  known as 
rules of the game which have in recent years been clothed with a status 
consistent with that held by obligatory rules of law.226 
3) Social revolutions have substituted new assumptions on which to base 
concepts of authority and power for old ones. 
4) The  growing interdependence  of  States,  especially  in  economic  and 
technological activities,  has vastly increased patterns of co-operation 
and reciprocal behaviour which have not been institutionalised in the 
traditional modes of law making.227 
5) National borders have become so porous that it is increasingly difficult 
to distinguish between matters of international  concern and those of 
national concern only. The march of the movement towards a culture 
of  universal  human  rights  often  brings  national  activities  before 
international organs under international criteria. 
6) Advances in science and technology now make it possible for States, 
particularly  wealthy  ones,  to  apply  informal  means  of  setting 
standards,  and  monitoring  adherence  to  those  standards  without 
necessarily referring to tight and tidy legal instruments.228 
Schachter argues that the attributes of competence and authority play an 
enormous role in ascertaining the occasion that imports obligation in law. 
By competence is meant the requirement that those actors who designate 
an occasion as  norm creating  are:  “… regarded  by those  to  whom the 
requirement  is  addressed as endowed with the requisite  competence or 
authority” to decide so.229 The essence of this requirement is made plain by 
the reaction of States when attempts are made to give legal status to reports 
of  expert  groups  like  the  International  Law  Commission,  or 
recommendatory organs such as the United Nations General Assembly, or 
some similar  body.  This  is  an area  of  difficulty  particularly  because  of 
international  tribunals’  attitude  towards  States’  voting  practices  in 
international institutions. Further, national military officials, international 
civil servants, private businessmen who have particular interests in specific 
aspects  of  international  life,230 international  organisations  -  both  inter-
governmental  and  non-governmental231 -  and  scientists232 all  contribute 
sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly to the formation of rules of 
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customary international law. At times they actually dictate the pace and 
content of that process.233 Therefore article 38(1)(b)’s declaration that it is 
States  that  have  competence  to  participate  in  the  creation  of  rules  of 
customary international  law is  distant  from the reality of  the process of 
custom. When the formal source of a doctrine and the practice of it appear 
contradictory, the legitimacy of the rules created inevitably suffers the way 
customary rules have suffered for some time now, and continue to. 
Schachterhas suggested a checklist for ascertaining whether or not 
rules of law are imbued with competence and authority. The first of these 
factors refers to the putative prescribers and the context in which they have 
acted.  He illustrates  this  with  reference  to  a  government  official  in  the 
national administration. He/she may have no authority to participate in the 
formulation of rules of international conduct. However, when he becomes 
a  representative  to  the  United  Nations  and  takes  part  in  formulating 
resolutions  explicitly  interpreting United  Nations  Charter  provisions,  he 
may come to be considered as possessing the requisite authority. Similarly, 
diplomats  engaged  in  official  correspondence  asserting  the  rights  and 
duties,  or  generals  engaged  in  hostilities  and  entering  in  truce 
arrangements,  will  have a measure  of  authority and will  be regarded as 
exhibiting  State  practice.  “In  fact,  several  recent  international  arbitral 
decisions have recognised as authoritative the practice of private airlines 
and oil  companies  when their  conduct  was carried  out  in  pursuance  of 
international agreements.”234  
The second concerns the willingness of the “prescribers” to take 
the steps necessary to actualise the intentions of their policy projections. 
The  third  factor  deals  with  the  extent  to  which  the  prescribing  group 
represents the principal participants among the intended audience. In the 
Asylum Case,  the  ICJ described  this  factor  as  the  requirement  that  the 
practice  of  States,  particularly  that  of  States  whose  interests  are  most 
affected by the promulgated rule, should be uniform and consistent.235 The 
fourth factor refers to the response of the target audience to the assertion of 
authoritativeness of a rule as obligatory. Schachter explains that this test is 
an empirical  one,  asserting  the  effectiveness  and  legitimacy of  the  rule 
formulated  on  the  occasion  regarded  as  an  obligation  forming one.  He 
writes that:
If the tacit rules of the game developed by the major powers are perceived 
by themselves  and  other  segments  of  the  community as  State  practice 
carried  out  by  entities  which  are  appropriate  decision-makers  for  that 
purpose  and  in  accordance  with  procedures  which  are  considered  as 
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appropriate, that practice would be authoritative (legitimate) in the sense 
in which (the term has been used). ... This does not imply that the practice 
of two or three States imposes obligations on others; it means that such 
practice  may be  viewed  as  authoritative  by  those  others.  And  if  that 
practice is also perceived as likely to be complied with, it  would then 
appropriately be characterised as practice accepted as law.236
Therefore,  obligation  in  international  law  in  general,  and  in  customary 
international law in particular,  is described as originating from the strict 
consent of States by some, and as resting on the will or consensus of the 
international  community by others.  It  seems that  both  these  approaches 
reflect a partial insight and not complete view of the issues involved. There 
is a case for saying that individually, each of these views tends towards 
reductionism,  which  almost  always  hinders  factual  inquiry.  This  is  not 
difficult to prove. If we take the notion of consent to mean the same thing 
as recognition, it must follow that practice becomes normatively binding 
on  States  only  when  they  interpret  their  specific  behaviour  as  being 
obligatory.  Such  a  conclusion  would  not  be  inconsistent  with  the 
proposition that to be binding, a rule of customary international law must 
be  perceived  by  the  target  audience  as  being  both  authoritative  and 
reasonably  effective.  Exaggerated,  this  view of  consent  can  lead  to  the 
confusion  that  tacit  consent  is  the  basis  of  obligation  for  customary 
international law.237 Warning should be taken that: 
The use of so elusive a concept as tacit agreement carries with it the risk 
that  an  established  rule  of  law  long  sustained  by  recognition  of  its 
authority and effectiveness will  be viewed as  subject  to  rejection by a 
particular State on the ground that it no longer agrees to it or has never 
expressly manifested its agreement.238
Another danger with such a reductionist approach to obligation is that it 
fails to represent the experience of the addressees of the international legal 
system. Evidence suggests that States recognise certain rules of customary 
international  law in the absence of any act  of consensual  acceptance of 
those rules.239
Conclusion
48  Legitimacy Deficit in Custom
To  conclude,  it  appears  that  neither  the  jurisprudence  of  international 
tribunals on customary international law, nor academic comment grounded 
on Hudson’s240 elements of custom has cleared the confusion surrounding 
custom.  Kelsen’s  “unanswerable  question”241 and  Allot’s  “imponderable 
paradox”242 remain unresolved. The standard of sufficiency for each of the 
elements  of  customary  international  law  remains  undetermined. 
International tribunals vary the requirements of State practice and  opinio  
juris particularly in difficult cases such as the Nicaragua Case.243 The result 
is  that  certainty  remains  elusive  regarding  the  creation  of  rules  of 
customary  international  law,  even  though  they  dominate  the  body  of 
international laws. This paradox brings to the fore, amongst other things, 
the issue of legitimacy and obligation in both customary international law, 
and international law in general. Perry’s question: “… By what mysterious 
process  does  the  normal become the  normative?”244 remains  unanswered 
and Kunz’s  assertion  that  the  present  rules  of  custom are  a fiction  that 
results in legal error,245 continues to ring true. 
Turning to the hypothesis formulated at the start of this chapter, it 
does  not  appear  that  there  is  a  significant  correlation  of  views  on  the 
conception  of  custom between  the  international  tribunals’  jurisprudence 
and the writings of publicists or between publicists themselves.246 Equally, 
it  does  not  appear  that  the  null-hypothesis  that  any coming together  of 
opinion  on  aspects  of  custom  between  international  tribunals  and 
publicists, and between publicists themselves is due to chance alone. This 
chapter  has  shown  that  although  custom  is  ridden  with  inconsistency, 
incoherency, indeterminacy, and unpredictability, factors that combine to 
impair  the  legitimacy  of  norms  it  creates,247 norms  of  customary 
international  law  continue  to  represent  the  majority  of  rules  of 
international law. Therefore, custom’s importance to international law is 
unequivocal. It is the task of this study to try and address the legitimacy 
deficit  in  custom.  Chapter  Two  looks  at  the  assumptions  that  subsume 
article  38(1)(b).  The  purpose  here  is  to  examine  the  thinking  that 
influenced the creation of the present doctrine of custom, and to compare 
its relevance to an international community so different from the one that 
the  drafters  of  articles  38(1)(b)  had  in  mind  when  they  crafted  this 
provision in 1922. Then the international community comprised a handful 
of  States,  perhaps  with  a  monolithic  culture.  Today,  the  international 
community boasts  nearly  two hundred  countries  with  as  many different 
cultures,  languages  and  expectations  of  international  law.  States 
themselves are individually and collectively confronted by so much need 
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for change in their behavioural patterns towards one another, and confront 
so much need for change in the management of humanitarian space. 
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